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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) as it was poured over by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Issues Preserved in the Trial Court: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction 
over the persons of defendants Eaglebrook Corporation and R.C. Tolman (collectively 
"Eaglebrook"). The question of personal jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed 
under a standard of correctness. See Jackson Construction Company, Inc. v. Marrs, 
100 P.3d 1211 (Utah 2004); Savsavanh v. Savsavanh, 145 P.3d 1166 (UT App. 2006); 
Wagner v. Clifton, 62 R3d 440 (Utah 2002). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that 
Eaglebrook was not entitled to attorneys fees based upon bad faith. The question of the 
award of attorneys fees based upon bad faith is within discretion of the trial court and the 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 
P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991); Griffith v. Griffith, 127 P.3d 1224 (UT App. 2005). 
3. Whether the trial court's ruling in Paragraph 10 of the Court's Order 
that "an award of attorneys' fees and costs is proper" was error. The question of whether 
to award attorneys' fees is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See, 
Jensen M.D. v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005). 
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4. Whether the trial court's ruling that Eaglebrook had preserved its 
right to assert dismissal was error flffi 5-90 of Order). This question is one of law and the 
standard of review is correctness. See Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440 (Utah 2002). 
5. Whether the trial court's finding that Eaglebrook had repeatedly 
requested service of process was without sufficient evidence, flf 6 of Order). This 
question is one of fact and is reviewed under the standard of insufficient evidence. See 
K.J. Sharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 
793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1990). 
6. Whether the trial court's finding that Eaglebrook was without the 
ability to defend was without sufficient evidence. This question is one of fact and is 
reviewed under the standard of insufficient evidence, (f 8 of Order). Id. 
B. Issues Not Preserved in the Trial Court: 
To the extent, if any, that issues set forth in Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 in that 
prior subsection were not properly preserved in the trial court, they should be overruled 
under the doctrine of plain error or manifest injustice. See, Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366 
(Utah 2007); Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 127 P.3d 1243 (UT App. 2005). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action brought by PacifiCorp dba Rocky Mountain Power 
("PacifiCorp") seeking a Judicial Declaration that it owns an access easement to its 
Winchester Hills Substation in St. George, Utah, and an order enjoining and restraining 
Eaglebrook, and its President, R.C. Tolman, from further interfering with PacifiCorp's 
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access to its substation via this access easement. In April, 2005, PacifiCorp filed a 
Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment to determine PacifiCorp's right to an easement 
crossing Eaglebrook's land. After hearing of November 16, 2006, the Court granted 
Eaglebrook's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed PacifiCorp's claims on the 
grounds that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Eaglebrook because Eaglebrook had not 
been served with a Summons and the Complaint. On March 22, 2007, the Trial Court 
entering its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entering findings and 
an Order dismissing PacifiCorp's Complaint without prejudice. This Order awarded 
costs in the amount of $427.97 but did not award Eaglebrook any attorneys fees. An 
appeal challenging the dismissal and the award of costs was filed by PacifiCorp on 
April 23, 2007;* a cross-appeal challenging the Court's refusal to award attorneys fees 
was filed on May 3, 2007. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. To secure reasonable access to its Winchester Hills' Substation, 
PacifiCorp filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, a Motion for 
Temporary and Preliminary Restraining Orders and a Memorandum in support on 
April 1, 2005. PacifiCorp alleged that it had a defined easement by agreement and usage 
across Eaglebrook's property to access its subdivision and that Eaglebrook was blocking 
1
 PacifiCorp's appeal of the dismissal and award of $427.97 in costs was dismissed by 
this Court on September 18, 2007 for failure by PacifiCorp to file its Appellant's Brief on 
or before September 4, 2007. This failure to file a Brief was due to the fact that counsel 
for PacifiCorp was informed that the parties, through direct negotiations not involving 
counsel, had settled the case. 
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and otherwise refusing this access. (R. 4-20). (Addendum A). These pleadings were 
filed by PacifiCorp's counsel's St. George office. Id. 
2. An ex parte Temporary Restraining Order enjoining and restraining 
Eaglebrook from blocking this access was entered by the Court on April 14, 2005." 
(R. 29). 
3. Following a hearing at which Eaglebrook was not represented, and 
without knowledge on the part of the Court or counsel that Eaglebrook had not been 
properly served, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction on April 26, 2005 restraining 
and enjoining Eaglebrook during the pendancy of the action from in any way interfering 
with PacifiCorp's access to its substation via its claimed easement. (R. 30-32). 
4. On August 15, 2005, and according to counsel's time records 
Eaglebrook's president R.C. Tolman met with Eaglebrook's counsel, Mr. Graham, to 
"review easement dispute documents". (R. 202). (Mr. Graham's home office is in Las 
Vegas, Nevada). (Addendum B). 
5. On September 6, 2005, Mr. Graham's associate, Attorney Brow, 
reviewed the file. (R. 202). 
6. On September 7, 2005, Mr. Graham and Attorney Brow reviewed a 
draft "Motion to Relieve Preliminary Injunction" and an affidavit in support of the 
motion. (R202). 
7. On December 7, 2005, Eaglebrook's St. George counsel, Eric 
Rodriguez, obtained a copy of pleadings filed by [PacifiCorp] and "reviewed all 
pleadings." (R. 202). 
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8. On December 27,2005, Mr. Graham and Mr. Rodriquez discussed 
by telephone and reviewed documents and photographs provided by Mr. Tolman for his 
affidavit. (R. 203). 
9. On February 6, 2006, Mr. Graham proposed "exhibit photos for 
court and highlighted] easement on roads for demonstrative purposes". (R. 204). 
10. On February 24, 2006, Eaglebrook filed its Petition to Set Aside 
Preliminary Injunction on the basis that it had not been properly served.2 (R. 33-34). 
(Addendum C). This Petition also asked that Eaglebrook be granted "permission to file 
an opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction." No motion to dismiss the 
Complaint was made. 
11. This Petition was accompanied by a comprehensive Memorandum 
of Point and Authorities in Support of Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction, as 
well as the Affidavit of Eaglebrook's President, R.C. Tolman. While raising the failure to 
serve Eaglebrook, the memorandum and affidavit primarily addressed the merits of 
PacifiCorp's claims and challenged the right of PacifiCorp to the claimed easement. 
(R. 35-58). Of the seventeen paragraphs if the affidavit fourteen addressed the merits of 
the case. Neither the memorandum nor the affidavit argued for dismissal. The 
memorandum also requested an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,000.00 "as 
this is the additional work that had to be performed to dig through the Court records to 
determine what had transpired without the knowledge of Defendants. (R. 47). Neither 
2
 Counsel filing petition was Mr. Rodriguez. 
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the memorandum nor the affidavit asked that the Complaint be dismissed. 
(Addendum D). 
12. On March 1, 2006, Eaglebrook filed a document entitled, "Errata to 
Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction," which attached photographs and maps of 
the disputed property. (R. 59-68). (Addendum E). These photographs and maps went 
entirely to the merits of the case. This filing did not ask for dismissal. 
13. Upon learning of the failure to serve Eaglebrook, on March 6, 2006, 
counsel for PacifiCorp unilaterally stipulated to the setting aside of the preliminary 
injunction and requested a hearing on the merits of PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary 
injunction. (R. 69-71). (Addendum F). 
14. On April 25, 2006, Eaglebrook filed a Notice of Utah Supreme Court 
Precedent attaching a case (Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 123 P.3d 432 
(Utah 2005)) and stating that, "the Court in Evans concluded that the most appropriate 
method to affix the easement is to assign the owner of the serviant estate the authority 
and discretion to designate the easement's location pursuant to its stated purpose in the 
grant. Therefore, pursuant to the precedence set forth in Evans, Mr. Tolman the owner of 
the serviant estate, hereby designates [an alternative easement]." (R. 77-87). 
(Addendum G). Again, this filing went exclusively to the merits of PacifiCorp's claims 
and did not raise dismissal. 
15. On April 27, 2006, a hearing was held before the trial court on 
PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary injunction. Both PacifiCorp and Eaglebrook were 
represented by counsel. At the hearing, while counsel for Eaglebrook made one brief 
8263131 6 
mention of the failure of service3, Eaglebrook did not make a motion to dismiss the 
Complaint based upon failure of service. Rather, Eaglebrook addressed the merits of 
PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary injunction through both its argument and its 
examination of witnesses. (R. 305, Transcript of hearing). Additionally Eaglebrook did 
not reserve the question of jurisdiction. 
16. This hearing on April 27, 2006 could not be completed due to the 
Court's time constraints. Accordingly, and following a conference in chambers, 
Eaglebrook expressly stipulated on the record to a continuance of the hearing and to the 
entry of a preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining Eaglebrook from interfering 
with PacifiCorp's use of the easement. (R. 305, p. 48)4. This stipulation was reduced to a 
written stipulation signed by counsel for Eaglebrook. 
3
 "We never were served at that point." (R. 305 at p. 7). 
4
 "THE COURT: Counsel, the Court is going to take a brief recess. I see Mr. Filter and 
Mr. Shaum have got a warrant, I presume, and so let's take about a five minute recess. 
(Short recess take) 
THE COURT: Mr. Rampton, do you want to make the record, or is Mr. Rodriquez 
going to? 
MR. RAMPTON: I'll make a record, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, great. 
MR. RAMPTON: Based upon the in chambers discussion that we just had where the 
Court had indicated that it cannot take any more time today to finish this evidentiary 
hearing and that it's going to have to be continued, I made the motion in chambers 
that the preliminary injunction remain in effect until the next hearing, provided that all 
regularly scheduled maintenance at that substation, Mr. Tolman will be given 
telephonic notice before any trucks go out there. That the company will have the right 
to access the substation during time of outage or emergency along the access road, 
and that trucks going in there will not exceed 10 miles an hour when they go in. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RAMPTON: And I think we have a stipulation to that effect. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rodriquez? 
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17. On May 11, 2006, the Court entered its Order of Continuance and 
Preliminary Injunction which, in part, restrained and enjoined Eaglebrook from 
interfering with PacifiCorp's access to its substation via the easement across 
Eaglebrook's property. This order was approved as to form by Eaglebrook's counsel, 
Mr. Rodriguez. (R. 107-111). (Addendum H). There was no reservation regarding the 
question of jurisdiction. 
18. On June 14, 2006, and at the request of Eaglebrook's counsel, 
Mr. Rodriquez, who cited his wife's illness, the parties stipulated to the further 
continuance of the preliminary injunction hearing which, in turn, continued the 
preliminary injunction in place. (R. 110, 111). (Addendum I). On June 20, 2006, the 
Court entered an order of continuance. This order was approved as to form by 
Eaglebrook's counsel. 
19. On July 18, 2006, the parties entered into a written stipulation 
further continuing the hearing on the preliminary injunction. (R. 112, 113). 
(Addendum J). This continuance was requested by Eaglebrook's counsel because of a 
scheduling conflict. 
20. On August 7, 2006, Robert C. Graham was admitted as associated 
counsel for Eaglebrook. (R. 131). 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: You Honor, we stipulate." 
(R. 305 at p. 48). 
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21. The hearing on PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary injunction was 
further continued to November 16, 2006 due to a conflict in the judge's schedule. 
(R. 149-151). 
22. On August 29,2006, and while the hearing was still under 
continuance and Eaglebrook was still subject to the preliminary injunction, Eaglebrook 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of PacifiCorp's Complaint for 
failure to serve the Complaint within 120 days. (R. 132-147). 
23. On October 2, 2006, PacifiCorp filed its Response to Motion for 
Summary Judgment arguing that Eaglebrook had waived its right to contest the 
jurisdiction of the Court by its participation in the merits of PacifiCorp's claims and by its 
stipulations to entry and continuance of a preliminary injunction. (R. 152-156). 
24. On November 16, 2006, by minute entry, the trial court granted 
Eaglebrook's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as well as the Preliminary Injunction. 
(R. 191). Counsel for PacifiCorp was not present at this hearing having notified the clerk 
of the Court the prior day that he was ill and having been told by the clerk that the matter 
would, therefore, be stricken from the calendar. (See Affidavit of Anthony L. Rampton at 
R. 166-172). Eaglebrook's counsel was requested to prepare an order "along with 
attorneys fees." 
25. On December 5, 2006, counsel for Eaglebrook filed a proposed 
order with the court that included specific awards of attorneys fees and costs. 
(Addendum K). 
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26. On December 12, 2006, PacifiCorp filed its Memorandum in 
Support of Objections to Order. This memorandum set forth relevant facts in opposition 
to the proposed order, and contested the dismissal on the basis that Eaglebrook had 
waived its right to service of process by actively and affirmatively participating in the 
merits of the case, and by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court. The memorandum 
also objected to Eaglebrook's petition for fees and costs and requested a hearing. 
(R. 165-190). (Addendum L). 
27. A hearing was held on February 12, 2007, addressing the Court's 
order dismissing the Complaint and the Preliminary Injunction and the objections to the 
order. (R. 307). With respect to the issue of attorneys fees, the Court stated as follows in 
response to counsel: 
Mr. Rampton: Lastly, Your Honor, the question of attorney's 
fees. When I got this motion -
The Court: Mr. Rampton, frankly, with respect to the 
issue of attorney's fees, if you would have 
appeared on November 16th, 2005, or 
someone from your firm would have 
appeared, I doubt very much, in fact, I believe 
the court would have not granted attorney's 
fees. So, with respect to that issue, I think 
that's a moot issue, because the court's going 
to set aside the court order with respect to 
attorney's fees at this time. I just don't think I 
would have awarded those at the time. So, I 
don't think you need to argue that, counsel. 
(R. 307 at p. 13). (Addendum J). 
With respect to the dismissal of the preliminary injunction and the 
Complaint, the Court stated: 
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The Court: And, counsel, I guess the court should make a 
record at this point in time. I indicated with 
respect to Mr. Graham and Mr. Rampton there 
is a question in the court's mind as to whether 
there was proper service in this case. And 
that's why I invited counsel back in chambers 
and discussed the case and indicated the 
court's reluctance to rescind the court's order 
dismissing the preliminary injunction and the 
complaint. And I suggested that all we need 
do is Mr. Rampton would go ahead and give 
service and, wouldn't that cure the problem? I 
mean, that seems that that would just cure the 
problem. 
(R. 307 at pp. 20, 21). (Addendum J). 
Lastly, and on the record, counsel for Eaglebrook accepted service of 
process of a refiled Complaint: 
Mr. Rampton: I would also like to get counsel's stipulation 
on the record that he has accepted service of 
process on behalf of the defendants in this 
action in the new action. 
The Court: Counsel, I appreciate that. Mr. Graham? 
Mr. Graham: I'm sorry? I missed that. I was getting a 
drink of water. 
The Court: Mr. Rampton is asking if he can have a 
stipulation that you went ahead and accepted 
service in the new action in chambers. 
Mr. Graham: Yes. I have no problem. 
(R. 307 at p. 28). (Addendum M). 
28. Also, at the hearing on PacifiCorp's objections, counsel for 
Eaglebrook stipulated on the record to accept service of the Complaint refiled by 
PacifiCorp that day, thereby reinstating PacifiCorp's claims. (R. 307 at pp. 28, 29). 
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29. Eaglebrook resubmitted its proposed order leaving blanks for the 
amounts of attorneys fees and costs. 
30. On March 22, 2007, the Court entered its Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment as proposed by Eaglebrook dismissing PacifiCorp's 
Complaint without prejudice and awarding Eaglebrook $427.97 in costs, but refusing to 
award Eaglebrook any attorneys fees. (R. 287-292). This order did not include a finding 
that PacifiCorp had acted in bad faith. (Addendum N). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to argue that it is entitled to attorneys fees, Eaglebrook must first show 
that the trial court properly dismissed the action for want of personal jurisdiction. By 
reason of Eaglebrook's participation on the merits without reservation, together with 
Eaglebrook's stipulations to the court's jurisdiction and the imposition of a binding 
preliminary injunction, Eaglebrook waived any right to contest jurisdiction under Rule 
4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Also, in order to be entitled to attorneys fees, Eaglebrook must show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to find bad faith on PacifiCorp's part. Not only did 
the trial court not find bad faith, Eaglebrook does not demonstrate, and the trial court did 
not find, the requisite factors for a determination of bad faith. Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing it to find bad faith, nor in refusing attorneys fees. 
The conclusion of law in paragraph 10 of the Court's order regarding attorneys 
fees is contrary to the law and was unintended by the trial court as is reflected in the trial 
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court's decision on the record that it was "going to set aside the court order with respect 
to attorney's fees at this time." 
The trial court findings that Eaglebrook preserved its right to assert dismissal for 
want of personal jurisdiction, that Eaglebrook repeatedly requested service of process, 
that Eaglebrook was entirely without the ability to defend this matter and that attorneys 
fees were proper were without sufficient, if any, evidence. 
That, if any of the foregoing findings were not preserved for appeal they are, 
nonetheless, reversible under the doctrines of plain error or manifest injustice. 
Because Eaglebrook was not entitled to attorneys fees below, it is, likewise, not 
entitled to attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
Should the Court reverse the trial court and determine that Eaglebrook is entitled 
to attorneys fees, the case should be remanded to the trial court for the determination of 
the amount of reasonable attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
In arguing that the lower court abused its discretion in not awarding attorneys fees, 
Eaglebrook takes an innocent inadvertence and attempts to turn it into an intentional and 
concerted effort by PacifiCorp to deny Eaglebrook its day in court. Eaglebrook would 
have this Court believe that it was left wandering in the wilderness with no ability to fend 
for itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. The undisputed facts simply do not 
support these contentions. The undisputed facts show without question that from the 
moment Eaglebrook became aware of the preliminary injunction it was fully informed as 
to the issues raised by PacifiCorp, and actively participated in the court proceedings in 
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this defense. As hereinafter set forth, Eaglebrook waived its right to contest, and in fact 
voluntarily submitted to tin iudsdu-tion of the lower court. In addition, Eaglebrook foils 
to demonstrate that either the facts or the law justify an award of attorneys fees. 
< '""I I lie I rial Com t Erred in Determining' Ilia! It Did Not Have Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Eaglebrook. 
This case initial!/) turns on the issue of w hethei the ti ial court had jurisdiction over 
summons under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Such service accomplishes 
two constitutionally required purposes. First, service of summons gives a defendant 
nnlirr nil llir i ILiiiib nnik1 ajMiiiMII ill IIIIIKI iiii npp iliinil1, I I Ilin'iinl. Sec Carlson v. Bos, 
740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987). Secondly, service of process gives the court jurisdiction 
over the person of the defendant. See Swetnam v. Dalby, 70 P °0 /TT*ah 1038). 
in several ways; 
1) By failure to assert the inadequacy of service in answer or by motion to 
K'- - h i - ILC -wdikiss & Campbm v. 
2) By litigating the merits of the action prior to tet>lim> t fie j urisdiction of the 
court. See Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah App i ^00). 
Illy iiiakiii|» iiii ii|>niiiin'iil nihil r, inn, uiisistt'iil vvilh ii motion lo dismiss. See 
Barlow v. Cappo. 821 P.2d465 (Utah App. 1991). 
") By asking the trial court for affirmative relief. See Downey State Bank v. 
Major-ijictkciicv Coi p. » 
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5) By consenting or stipulating to the jurisdiction of the trial court. See 
Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993). 
Utah courts expressly recognize that a willingness to submit to a court's 
jurisdiction waives jurisdictional arguments. "[Pjeople are free to waive the requirement 
that a court must have personal jurisdiction over them before that court can adjudicate a 
case involving them. . . . '[D]efects in personal jurisdiction can be waived.'" Phone 
Directories Co.. Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, U 15, 8 P.3d 256. Similarly, in a 2005 
memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals ruled "Hatch's jurisdiction argument lacks 
merit because Christensen willingly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Thus, no service was required." Hatch v. Sykes, 2005 UT App. 280, *1 (mem.) 
(emphasis added). Also, in Curtis v. Curtis, a custody dispute between former spouses 
involving a Utah divorce decree and a protective order issued by Mississippi court, the 
Utah Court of Appeals discussed whether the Mississippi court had jurisdiction over the 
ex-wife. 789 P.2d 717, 719-720 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court ultimately ruled that 
the Mississippi court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, but briefly discussed 
personal jurisdiction also. Id. at 725 n.17. The court recognized that "the distinction 
between general and special appearances has been effectively abolished by Rule 12(b), 
which permits jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses to be joined." Id. The court 
went on to briefly discuss whether ex-wife had waived personal jurisdiction, and stated 
"[w]e would be hard pressed to view her behavior as a waiver." Id. Thus, Curtis 
recognizes that personal jurisdiction may be waived, under some circumstances, despite 
the changes to Rule 12(b). 
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Moreover 1 ffuiii com h have t:x - * "•--• 
and the rule that a party may consent to i»i w ai\ c a iiirisdietKMUI argument squares with 
that rational >ci v KC of process implement/, iuv ^v ^wiiral due process requirement 
thai a tlefeiiilaiil IK. inloimul ul'lhe (X'lidin^ lc(i?,al «n\tu>n ami IK \na\ nk il w ilh an 
opportunity to defend against the action.'" Saysavanh v. Saysavanh, 2006 UT App 385, 
Tf 9, 145 P.3d 1166 (citation omitted). In this case,, it cannot be disputed that Defendants 
weir jiilortiied i i l ' l l i r case iiml IVCIV prn\ iiieill " iilliii in nppoihimtv In nib/lend, indeed, fhe\ 
actively participated in such defense. 
In the instance case, Eaglebrook has waived any right to challenge the jurisdiction 
1 • Eaglebrook Litigated the Merits of the Case Prior to Testing by 
Motion the Jurisdiction of the Court. 
W hile Eaglebi Dok i aised the lack of sei v ice in its initial I Petition to Set 
Aside Preliminary Injunction, by thereafter arguing the merits of the case without 
contesting jurisdiction, Eaglebrook waived this right. In both the memorandum in 
support of its petition, and in the Affidavit i . . ....an re ^ ah, 
Eaglebrook addresses by factual statement and K* - m i e n t die merits of PacifiCorp's 
complaint and motion f>r pu-liniinai \ mianeiioih Mnnlarh. ii the hearing on the motion 
preliminary injunc. - .. .-. .. . ^ 
jurisdiction of the Court. Rather, through both its arguments and its examination of the 
witness, Eaglebrook addressed onh ilk; merits of the case. If Eaglebrook intended to 
challenge the jurisdiction u .u<, i w*.,. was required to make a motion to dismiss before 
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it went forward with its defense on the merits. See Dennett v. Powers, 536 P.2d 135 
(Utah 1975). 
2. Eaglebrook Made Arguments That Were Inconsistent With a 
Challenge to the Court's Jurisdiction. 
As noted above, the arguments made in both its petition and at hearing 
sought defeat of the motion for summary judgment on the merits. These arguments 
sought the denial of preliminary injunction and were inconsistent with any argument that 
the Court did not have personal jurisdiction over Eaglebrook. 
3. Eaglebrook Asked the Trial Court for Affirmative Relief. 
In its memorandum supporting the Petition to Set Aside Preliminary 
Injunction, Eaglebrook asks for affirmative relief in two respects. First, Eaglebrook 
asked the Court to deny PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary injunction on the merits. 
Secondly, Eaglebrook requests the Court to make an award of attorneys fees in the 
amount of $1,000.00. By seeking these items of affirmative relief, Eaglebrook submitted 
to the personal jurisdiction of the Court as the Court would require jurisdiction to make 
these determinations. 
4. Eaglebrook Stipulated to the Personal Jurisdiction of the Court. 
Perhaps most significantly, Eaglebrook on four separate occasions 
stipulated to the jurisdiction of the trial court. At the hearing on April 27, 2006, 
Eaglebrook's counsel stipulated on the record that the Court could impose a preliminary 
injunction restraining and enjoining Eaglebrook from interfering with PacifiCorp's access 
to its substation across Eaglebrook's property. This verbal stipulation was followed by a 
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written stipulation. Ihe order imnosin^ reliminar junction date ; V - l s 006, 
was approved as to form by ~ debrook i \ -/der provided as follows: "(2) the 
following Preliminary Injunction is hereby entered pursuant to stipulation, to be effective 
ind until this matter can b sheai d an ::! a determination by the Coi 11 t can be made " On 
June 14, 2006 and on July 18, 2006, Eaglebrook entered into written stipulations 
continuing the hearing on PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary injunction. By these 
slipiili'iliiuiiis, Hafjd"tiuntil agtvaf In line nmlimiMij' imposition I lilt" pn liiiiiiiiitiitn iniiiiii'linii 
entered on Ma.) 11, 2006, and, therefore, to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court. 
Eaglebrook clearly and continuously stipulated to the personal jurisdiction of the trial 
i in 1 "l! i/iJv», . ii iii .nil i 'liii"! In ./otitesl Sm \\ pmudh lion. 
For these reasons, Eaglebrook waived its right to contest the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and the Court's dismissal of PacifiCorp's complaint on this basis constituted 
B Eaglebrook Does Not Show, and the Court Did Not Find, Bad Faith. 
Under Utah law attorneys Ices can be awarded only it they are authorized by 
statute ni h\ on ml! :^ ec L,\;c bldW Lsank .. D^^WW ' " 
Stc i v ai t. v. Utah Public Service Commission. 885 P.2d 7>l> (L \ih 1 w Ij. In this case there 
is no contract and no statute that specifically provides for attorneys fees. An exception to 
. ; I . I ' J uHh :IK -ouit-hall <n\ aid reasonable 
attorneys ices to J prevailing p;vt^ :. the * uirt 
determines that the action was brought without merit and 
''< 4 ' - >" M -:' IN verted in good fait1 
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To prove that a claim is "without merit" under this statute, the party asserting an 
award of attorneys fees must first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or "of little 
weight or importance" having no basis in lawr or fact. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 
(Utah App. 1991) citing Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). This "without 
merit" determination is a question of law and, therefore it is reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, supra. 
In the instant case, Eaglebrook does not contend, and the Court did not find, that 
the underlying declaratory judgment action by PacifiCorp is either without merit, 
frivolous, or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact. Consequently, 
in order to show entitlement to attorneys fees under § 78-27-56, Eaglebrook must show 
"bad faith." 
The question of whether there has been bad faith is within the discretion of the 
trial court. Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991); 
Cowley v. Porter, 127 P.3d 1224 (UT App. 2005). Accordingly, on appeal deference is 
owed to the trial judge who presided over the proceeding and has first hand knowledge of 
the proceeding. Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1998). A finding of bad 
faith requires one or more of the following factors: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (2) the party intended to take unconscionable 
advantage; or (3) the party intended to hinder, delay, or defraud others.5 MI VIP A 
5
 Eaglebrook's conduct better fits within this framework. 
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Enterprises v. Stean-Adams, 122 P.3d 144 (UT App. 2005); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
1 -'aciinorp uiu INOI Lack an nonesi penei in me rropneiary or its 
Actions. 
At the time of the entrv iTihe initial entr> of the Temporary Restraining 
Order and the Preliminary i.Muiiu„ - . h tl le Com t and coi msel foi PacifiCorp honestly 
upon learning that Eaglebrook had no! been s r ^ . i PaufiC - n unilaterally stipulated to 
the setting aside of the rfeiiwiuuh > iii.unv.tn>ij. 1 hereaiter, everything that was done, 
i!in,linliii|.f) the hearing i in llic motion (or |>ia(kIimiiiiir\' ni|iiik:lioii, llic coiiliiiu.iikr of llu1 
hearing, the entry of a preliminary injunction pending the continued hearing, and the 
further continuances of the hearing were done with either 1- )• u brook s acquiescence or 
stipi ilati 3ii I he faih it e to sei \ e Eaglebrc ( * " f M 
ip Did Not Intend, Nor Did It Take Unconscionable 
jntage of Eaglebrook. 
/ '. in _ JJ» section, Viu *••- ^ - a ..*e 
Preliminary Injunction he set aside upon learning that Eaglebrook ^ad ^ot been served. 
While Eaglebrook feigns prejudice in not having PacifiCorp's Complaint and Motion, the 
fads clearly hchc Ihui fad h liable 
together with the Memorandum and Aiildavii of R. L. ioiinan submitted at the same 
time, clearly show that counsel for Eaglebrook had all PacifiCorp filings. This fact is 
6
 This discrepancy can only be explained by the fact that Eaglebrook's appellate counsel 
was not involved at this time. 
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undeniably evidenced by the fact that all of the aforementioned papers filed by 
Eaglebrook contesting the Preliminary Injunction, as well as Eaglebrook's actions at the 
hearing on April 27, 2006, addressed at great length the allegations and arguments made 
by PacifiCorp in its Complaint and motion. This fact is further evidenced by counsel's 
statement in its memorandum requesting attorneys fees: 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Mr. Tolman and Eaglebrook 
demand that this Court set aside the Preliminary Injunction. 
Further, should this Court determine that notice and an 
opportunity to be heard should have been given, the 
attorney's fees in the amount of One Thousand No/100 
Dollars ($1,000.00) should be granted as this is the additional 
work that had to be performed to dig through the Court 
records to determine what had transpired without the 
knowledge of the Defendants. 
(R. at p. 47). 
There is no evidence that PacifiCorp intended to take advantage, let alone 
unconscionable advantage, of Eaglebrook. 
3. PacifiCorp did not intend to hinder, delay or defraud Eaglebrook. 
After stipulating to the setting aside of the Preliminary Injunction on 
March 8, 2006, the parties went ahead with the preliminary injunction hearing on 
April 27, 2006. The continuance of this hearing was based upon the Court's time 
constraints and was stipulated to by Eaglebrook. Thereafter, all additional continuances 
were agreed upon and stipulated to by the parties. The case was in this posture until 
Eaglebrook filed its summary judgment motion on August 29, 2006. All filings and 
hearing after this date dealt entirely with Eaglebrook's actions, not PacifiCorp's. There is 
no evidence that PacifiCorp intended to hinder, delay or defraud Eaglebrook. 
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Eaglebrook's • v I \,•- . - - r the factors reqi lisite foi a 1: a :1 faith 
determination, and the trial court's failure and/or refusal to find those factors, preclude a 
finding of bad faith. Failure to pro\ e bad faith precludes an award of attorneys fees 
under § 78 77 Sf\ r( hi try! i n11111 t\u\ n HI ,'ihisc I(\ di^nctim \\ \\\* <r Hoards. ' 
C. The Court's Conclusion of Law on the Issue of Attorneys Fees is Error. 
Tin1 l 'mill'1!11 mi li is mi I in ill (in piiia^iaph 10 itiii ils ( hdrr .iiiiinl Defendants' Motion lor 
Summary Judgment provides as follows: 
THIS COURT FINDS that as the Plaintiff did not take the 
simple step of withdrawing this case, but persisted in 
advancing an improperly formed case against good reason, 
and as the Plaintiff has unnecessarily used the Court's time 
and caused the Defendants to defend in a void of pleadings 
and proper procedure, an award of attorney fees and costs is 
proper. More specifically;, an award of those fees and costs 
that cannot benefit the Defendants in any future action should 
be awarded. This Court notes that a detailed billing statement 
has been submitted by the Defendants to the Court and the 
Court has identified those fees and costs it deems reasonably 
related to the improper actions of the Plaintiff and sets forth 
the total amount of those fees and costs awarded below. 
I In di'U'iiniii.ili HI nil iil'lir erntitlniiciit nil iillnnieys Ices is a queslion nl In "t "' 
appeal, the standard of review is correctness. Jensen, MLD, v , Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 
(Utah 2005). While couched as a finding of fact, the quoted ruling is a conclusion of 
Ln\ I lus conclusion r. in i ulnn n iiili ill d lllllic fads ami llm l.i \, ir. ninii andmus-
reversed. 
As noted in the prior section, there is no .factual basis for the award of attorneys 
fees. None of the requisite findings, including a specific finding of 'bad faith, were made 
826313 1 22 
by the Court. Consequently, the Court's determination in Finding No. 10 regarding 
attorneys fees is error. 
In addition, it is clear from the Court's statements in open court, and by the 
Court's refusal to enter any amount as attorneys fees, clearly show that it was not the 
intent of the Court to award attorneys fees. Again, in response to counsel's argument in 
opposition to attorney fees at the hearing on February 12, 2007, pertaining to attorneys 
fees, the Court expressly withdrew any award of attorneys fees: 
THE COURT: Mr. Rampton, frankly, with respect to the 
issue of attorney's fees, if you would have appeared on 
November 16th, 2005, or someone from your firm would 
have appeared, I doubt very much, in fact, I believe the court 
would have not granted attorney's fees. So, with respect to 
that issue, I think that's a moot issue, because the court's 
going to set aside the court order with respect to attorney's 
fees at this time. I just don't think I would have awarded 
those at the time. So, I don't think you need to argue that, 
counsel. 
(R. 307 at p. 13). 
In addition, in the final Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment the 
Court, in paragraph 12, and in his own hand, inserted as recoverable costs the amount of 
$427.97 but draw a line through the space provided for attorneys fees. (R. 281 and 
Addendum N). 
Not only is the Court's conclusion of law in paragraph 10 regarding attorneys fees 
in error, it was clearly unintended. 
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Certain of the Lower Court's Findings Weie Without Sufficient Evidence. 
In its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Addendum M), the 
Court nthTni three: spi i iilllii lindini'/i thill arc sulliniil I'videnhiirs support in the n unl 
To challenge a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even reviewing evidence in 
light ill "I I in mi ilillii 1 the i Hull In Imi the i « itinit e in . l i iMiI l innif In >uppiul the 
findings. See K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Turnbaugh v. 
Anderson, 793 R2d 939 (Utah App, 1.990). With respect to three findings by the trial 
coi ii t, thei e is no evidence in suppoi I: of tin 1111< i 111 ,'H > I o 111 a i J i, 11 «i,s (1 H I V<: OI d i s a bso 1111 r! \ 
devoid of any evidence that would support these findings. 
1. There Is No Support for the Finding That Eaglebrook Preserved Its 
R I ght to Challenge Jurisdiction. 
' I he only mention in 'the record regarding Eaglebrook's assertion of lack of 
jurisdiction before it filed its Motion for Summary Judgment appears in its Petition to Set 
Aside Preliminary Injunction and the memorandum in suppoi t of th is petition filed on 
February 24, 2006. (Addendum N). 
Paragraph 5 of the Court's Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment provides n. } .w: ^ ..,..• W<J-
- MS COUR'I FINDS that the Defendants ha\ . preserved 
,._.] right to assert the dismissal of this action juder U II.CP. 
4(b)(i) in their pleadings in oral arguments bei< ic this Court 
during previous appearances. 
There were foi lr oppoi I:i i n ities for Eaglebrook to preserve this right and it 
3d on each occasion, During the hearing on PacifiCorp's motion for preliminary 
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injunction on April 27, 2006, counsel for Eaglebrook addressed the merits and stipulated 
to the entry of a preliminary injunction. The transcript of this hearing (R. 305) is devoid 
of any reservation. The written stipulation that was signed by counsel for Eaglebrook 
memorializing this stipulation, as well as the court's Order imposing the preliminary 
injunction, contain no reservation to contest jurisdiction. The stipulations to the 
continuance dated June 14, 2006, and July 18, 2006, extending the Preliminary Injunction 
make no mention of any reservation of rights. Not only is there insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's finding of reservation, there is no evidence to support this 
finding. 
2. There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Finding of the Trial 
Court That Eaglebrook Repeatedly Requested Service of Process. 
Paragraph 6 of the Court's Order provides as follows: 
THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants repeatedly 
requested service of process and of the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and that no such service was ever 
effectuated, even after the expiration of 120 days to the 
present. The Plaintiff simply chose to ignore the reasonable 
requests of the Defendants to properly form this case. 
Again, the record is devoid of any evidence of a request for service of 
process or of the motion for preliminary injunction. To the contrary, there was no need 
for Eaglebrook to make such a request. It is perfectly clear that at the time Eaglebrook 
filed its Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction, it already had copies of all of the 
pleadings filed to date by PacifiCorp, including the Complaint and the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. Eaglebrook's counsel's time records (Addendum B) clearly 
reflect that they had obtained these documents as early as August 15, 2005. On 
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Deceml >ei 7 ,200i > - • •• - .h,-.-i* .vfl,-, 
Eric Rodriguez "reviewed aii pleadings 4" A H of the parsers filed bv Faglebrook in 
support of its posi in >n. including the dtlidavit < • I Tolman, clean* ?•. uectthat 
Eaghtbi >ol» Iliiii Il i opirs of till of Put i f iCoip\ liliii)'!) "\«i nrinJInigly., t l inr w .is no ivnson 
for Eaglebrook to request service, and, in fact, there is no evidence in the record that it 
made such a request. There is insufficient evidence to support this finding by the trial 
c 
Fhere Is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Finding 
That Eaglebrook Was Entirely Without the Ability to Defend This 
Case. 
Paragraph K ol l l r ( 'oinl's Onln pn vales
 ris follows 
THIS COURT FINDS that under the circumstances, the 
Defendants were entirely without ability to properly or 
adequately defend this matter as the case, from the beginning, 
has not been properly framed by the Plaintiff because of the 
Plaintiff's inability to follow basic procedure as set forth 
clearly in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
There is no question that Eaglebrook was without the ability to defend this 
action ,il I IK hint* 25, 2005. i U that tin le, Eaglebi ool : had 
not been served, had no notice of these proceedings, and, therefore, had no opportunity to 
be heard. However, as soon as counsel for Pacific orp leanu u oi \\u> i<ulure of service, 
Pacific \ i|ii iiiiiiiila(ti',t,ll\ 'ilipuliiU'd 111 • 11 P'a^lebrool' kid nol Inn n s c n n l rind 111 • 11 Ik 
Preliminary Injunction could be set aside. However, as reflected in the prior subsection, 
by the time that Eaglebrook had filed its petition and supporting materials addressing 
I'rium o'i(»\ iiniiilin III linn piclnmiiim injunction .iiiinil in mi iliiii point forward 1'agMnoi Is 
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not only had the ability to properly or adequately defend this matter, Eaglebrook did, in 
fact, adequately defend this matter on the merits. Again, there is no evidence, and 
certainly no sufficient evidence, to support the trial court's finding that Eaglebrook could 
not properly or adequately defend this matter after PacifiCorp had been advised that 
Eaglebrook had not been served. 
E. Certain of the Trial Court's Findings Constituted Plain Error. 
Should this Court determine that the findings of fact addressed in the prior section 
were not properly challenged before the trial court and, therefore, were not preserved, 
such findings should nonetheless be set aside on the basis that they constituted plain error 
or manifest injustice. 
An appellate court may reverse a lower court's finding on an issue not properly 
preserved for appeal if a party can show plain error. See Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366 
(Utah 2007); State of Utah v. Schwenke, (unpublished opinion) 2007 UT App. 354. This 
Court in Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Svkes, 127 P.3d 1243 (UT App. 2005), set forth the 
requirements for establishing plain error as follows: 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that 
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant. 
127P.3dl243atp.9. 
For the reasons set forth in the prior subsection, in that those findings had no 
evidentiary support in the record, were in error. These errors should have been obvious 
to the trial court because there was no evidence in the record to support them. These 
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errors are harmful to the extent that Eaglebrook uses them to argue that PacifiCorp was, 
in any respect, in bad faith. Accordingly, the findings attacked in the prior subsection 
must be set aside as plain error. 
F. Eaglebrook Is Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees on Appeal. 
This Court has ruled in Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 
(Utah App. 1991) that when a party who received attorneys fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. The corollary of 
this rule is, of course, when a party does not receive attorneys fees below, that party is not 
entitled to attorneys fees incurred on appeal. Since Eaglebrook did not and legally should 
not (see arguments supra.) receive attorneys fees below, Eaglebrook is not entitled to fees 
incurred on this appeal. 
G. Should This Court Determine that Eaglebrook is Entitled to Attorneys Fees 
the Case Must Be Remanded to the Trial Court for a Determination of the 
Amount that Is Reasonable. 
Calculation of reasonable attorneys fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Should this Court determine 
that Eaglebrook is entitled to attorneys fees, the case must be remanded to the trial court 
for its determination of the reasonable amount. There is a wide range of possibilities. 
Since anew and identical action is now pending fees incurred addressing the merits of 
the case should not be recoverable. Realistically the only fees that might be recoverable 
are those incurred for the time counsel spent reviewing and retaining copies of 
PacifiCorp's initial filings, i.e. $1,000.00. In any event, this calculation is the prerogative 
of the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the lower court's denial of attorneys fees should 
be affirmed. If the denial of attorneys fees is reversed, the case must be remanded to the 
lower court for its calculation of what fees are reasonable. 
Dated this 28th day of January, 2008. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Anthony L JRfampton 
Attomev^ior PacifiCorp 
826313 I 29 
ADDENDA: 
Addendum A - PacifiCorp's Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Addendum B - Eaglebrook's counsel's time sheets 
Addendum C - Eaglebrook's Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction, 
together with the Memorandum and Affidavit of R.C. Tolman in support of the 
petition 
Addendum D - Eaglebrook's Errata to its petition submitting photographs and 
maps of Eaglebrook's property 
Addendum E - Stipulation to set aside preliminary injunction 
Addendum F - Notice of Supreme Court Precedent 
Addendum G - Order of Continuance dated May 11, 2006 
Addendum H - Stipulation of Continuance dated June 14, 2006 
Addendum I - Stipulation to Continuance dated July 18, 2006 
Addendum J - Proposed Order dated December 5, 2006 
Addendum K - PacifiCorp's Memorandum in Support of Objections to Order 
Addendum L - Transcript of Hearing on February 12, 2007 
Addendum M - Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Dated 
March 22, 2007 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 g ^ d a y of January, 2008,1 caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing , to be mailed via first-class U.S. Mail, postage paid, to 
the following: 
ROBERT GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES 
Robert C. Graham 
Adam P. McMillan 
1091 N. Bluff Street, Suite 306 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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Tab A 
Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2862) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-7379 
Fax: (801)328-0537 
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. O S O S O O ^ U 
Judge L o ^ A o v J 
Plaintiff PacifiCorp, dba Utah Power ("Utah Power"), for its Complaint alleges as follows: 
1. Utah Power is an Oregon corporation in the business of generating, distributing, and 
marketing electrical power and services in Washington County, State of Utah. Utah Power owns and 
operates an electrical substation (hereafter, "Winchester Hills Substation") located in the Winchester 
Hills Subdivision situated in St. George, Utah. 
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2. Defendant Eaglebrook Corporation ("Eaglebrook") is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Washington County, State of Utah. Eaglebrook developed the 
Winchester Hills Subdivision presently located in St. George, Utah. 
3. Defendant R. C. Tolman ("Tolman") is an individual and a resident of St. George, 
Utah, and specifically resides in the Winchester Hills Subdivision. Mr. Tolman, through his 
corporation Eaglebrook, of which he is president, developed the Winchester Hills Subdivision. 
4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953). 
5. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1 (1953) in that the 
action involves an interest in real property situated in Washington County, State of Utah. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
6. On or about January 10, 1991, Eaglebrook conveyed to Utah Power by Warranty Deed 
a tract of land situated in the Winchester Hills Subdivision for the use by Utah Power for a Substation. 
7. In addition to the specific conveyance, the Warranty Deed also conveyed an undefined 
access easement to the Substation as follows: "Grantor also warrants that access to the above property 
will be negotiated at a later date. Access will be an extension of Winchester Drive running South of 
Lot 105, Winchester Hills Phase n, and extending in a Southeasterly direction to the above property." 
8. On or about April 1, 1992, Utah Power completed the installation of its Substation on 
the acquired tract of land in Winchester Hills Subdivision. During the construction period, and 
consistent with the Warranty Deed, access to the Substation site was provided by an extension to 
Winchester Drive south of Lot 105. 
9. At the request of Tolman, and following a representation by Tolman that Utah Power 
could use the extension to Winchester Drive to access its substation, Utah Power 
contributed $3000-$3500 to the cost of grading and subpaving the extension. 
10. Following the installation of the Substation, service, maintenance, and inspection of 
the Winchester Hills Substation was continually accessed by the aforestated extension of Winchester 
Drive for a number of years. 
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11. At some time after the installation of the Substation, R. C. Tolman built his home on a 
lot immediately north of the Utah Power property. Mr. Tolman paved the extension of Winchester 
Drive to his property. 
12. Approximately six or seven months ago, Mr. Tolman met Dennis K. Smith, Utah 
Power's Substation Foreman for Utah Power's Southern Region, and advised Mr. Smith that Utah 
Power could no longer use the paved extension of Winchester Drive as access to its Substation. Mr. 
Tolman insisted that access be obtained via a rudimentary road running to the south and east of the 
extension of Winchester Drive. This dirt road is impassable for larger vehicles and vehicles without 
four-wheel drive and is not suitable access to the Substation. 
13. Since the date of this meeting, Mr. Tolman has continued to refuse to allow Utah 
Power to access the Winchester Hills Substation by way of extension of Winchester Drive. Mr. 
Tolman has posted a sign at the entrance to the extension of Winchester Drive which reads as follows: 
"No Utah Power Trucks or Equipment on Private Driveway." 
14. Pursuant to the Warranty Deed, together with the actions of Tolman and Utah Power 
thereafter, Utah Power has an access easement via the paved extension of Winchester Drive to the 
Winchester Hills Substation. 
15. It is necessary for Utah Power to be able to utilize this access for purposes of 
maintaining the Substation on an ongoing basis. In addition, in the event of a power 
failure or outage, it is imperative that Utah Power have access on an immediate basis 
to the Substation by way of the paved extension of Winchester Drive to address the 
emergency. Without such access, Utah Power and its customers will suffer immediate 
and irreparable harm. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
16. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15 are incorporated herein by reference. 
17. By reason of Tolman's representation that Utah Power could use the extension to 
Winchester Drive as its access to the Winchester Hills Substation, together with 
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Utah Power's contribution to the grading and subpaving of the extension, 
Eaglebrook and Tolman are equitably estopped from denying this access. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Utah Power demands judgment as follows: 
A. That the Court determine that Utah Power has a contractual access easement to its 
Winchester Hills Substation via the existing paved extension of Winchester Drive. 
B. That Eaglebrook and Tolman are equitably estopped from denying that Utah Power 
has an access easement to its Winchester Hills Substation via the existing paved 
extension to Winchester Drive. 
C. That the Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order restraining and enjoining 
Eaglebrook and Mr. Tolman from interfering with Utah Power's access via the paved extension of 
Winchester Drive to the Winchester Hills Substation. 
C. That the Court enter orders preliminarily and permanently enjoining Eaglebrook and 
Mr. Tolman from interfering with Utah Power's access to the Winchester Hills Substation via the 
paved extension of Winchester Drive. 
D. For such other relief as the Court determines appropriate under the circumstances. 
DATED this 2005. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
D. Williams Ronnow, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
One Utah Center 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
688845vl 4 
Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2681) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435)628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORIGINAL 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
UTAH POWER'S MOTION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. O«5C&>D0S4L 
Judge L ,o o I Q K ; 
This is an action brought by PacifiCorp, dba Utah Power ("Utah Power"), seeking a judicial 
declaration that it owns an access easement to its Winchester Hills Substation in St. George, Utah, and 
an order enjoining and restraining defendants Eaglebrook Corporation ("Eaglebrook"), and its president, 
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R. C. Tolman ("Tolman"), from further interfering with Utah Power's access to its Winchester Hills 
Substation via its access easement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Utah Power is an electric utility which generates, transmits and distributes electrical 
power throughout the Intermountain West and including Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. Eaglebrook and/or Tolman are the developers of Winchester Hills Subdivision, which 
presently is located within the city confines of St. George, Utah. Tolman owns a lot upon which he has 
built a home in or adjacent to Winchester Hills Subdivision. 
3. In the late 1980s, Utah Power through its Field Engineer, Greg Bean, participated in 
meetings before the Washington County Planning Commission during which Utah Power proposed the 
development of a subdivision on property located in Washington County then owned by Tolman or 
Eaglebrook. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 2) 
4. In the context of these discussions, it was proposed that Utah Power upgrade, construct, 
operate and maintain a substation site on this land. Ultimately, a site for the substation on land owned 
by Eaglebrook or Tolman was approved. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 2) 
5. On or about April 12, 1991, Eaglebrook executed a Warranty Deed conveying these 
properties to Utah Power for purposes of constructing, operating and maintaining its Winchester Hills 
Subdivision. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 3; Smith AFF. Paragraph 3) 
6. This Warranty Deed included the following language regarding access to the substation: 
"Grantor also warrants that access to the above property will be negotiated at a later date. 
Access will be an extension of Winchester Drive running South of Lot 105, Winchester 
Hills Phase II, and extending in a Southeasterly direction to the above property." 
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(Bean AFF. Paragraph 4; Smith AFF. Paragraph 3, together with exhibits thereto) 
7. Shortly following the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed, Mr. Bean met with 
Tolman who represented to Bean his intent to extend Winchester Drive east and south from its then 
terminus to access the substation. Mr. Tolman requested that Utah Power contribute one-half of the cost 
of this extension. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 5) 
8. Utah Power agreed to contribute, and did contribute, one-half of the cost of the extension 
of Winchester Drive ($3000-$3500) which was used to grade the road and lay the road base. (Bean 
AFF. Paragraph 6) 
9. Construction of the Winchester Hills Substation was completed on April 1, 1992. During 
this construction period, access to the substation site was provided by the aforementioned extension of 
Winchester Drive running south of Lot 105. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 7; Smith AFF. Paragraph 4, together 
with exhibits thereto) 
10. Following completion of the construction of the substation, Utah Power has until very 
recently used the extension to Winchester Drive for purposes of operating, inspecting and maintaining 
the Winchester Hills Subdivision. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 7; Smith AFF. Paragraph 5). 
11. At some point after the installation of the Winchester Hills Substation, Tolman built his 
home on a lot immediately north of the Utah Power property acquired in 1991. In conjunction with the 
construction of his home, Tolman paved the extension of Winchester Drive to his property. (Bean AFF. 
Paragraph 8; Smith AFF. Paragraph 6). 
12. Approximately six or seven months ago, Tolman met with Dennis K. Smith, Utah 
Power's substation foreman for Utah Power's Southern Region, during which meeting Tolman advised 
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Smith that Utah Power could no longer use the paved extension to Winchester Drive to access its 
substation. Rather, Mr. Tolman insisted that access to the substation be obtained via a rudimentary dirt 
road running to the south and east of the extension to Winchester Drive. (Bean AFF. Paragraph 9; Smith 
AFF. Paragraph 7). 
13. At the conclusion of this meeting, Smith used this dirt road in exiting the substation and 
found that it would be impassible for larger vehicles and vehicles without four-wheel drive. As such, 
Smith determined that the dirt road is not suitable access to the substation. (Smith AFF. Paragraph 7). 
14. Since the date of this meeting, Tolman continues to refuse to allow Utah Power to access 
the substation by way of the extension to Winchester Drive. Tolman has posted a sign at the entrance to 
the extension of Winchester Drive which reads as follows: "No Utah Power trucks or equipment on 
private driveway." (Bean AFF. Paragraph 9; Smith AFF. Paragraph 8). 
15. It is necessary for Utah Power to have suitable access by way of the paved extension of 
Winchester Drive to the substation to maintain and inspect the substation on an ongoing basis. In 
addition, in the event of a power failure or outage, it is imperative that Utah Power have access on an 
immediate basis to the substation by way of the paved extension to Winchester Drive. Without such 
access, Utah Power and its customers will suffer immediate and irreparable harm. (Smith AFF. 
Paragraph 9). 
ARGUMENT 
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by the provisions of Rule 
65 A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to this rule, a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction may issue upon a showing by the applicant that: (1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm 
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unless the order or injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever 
damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) the order or 
injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood 
that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on 
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
All four of these elements of Rule 65 A must be met for an injunction to issue. See Utah Medical 
Products, Inc., v Searcy, 958 P.2d 221 (Utah 1998). 
A. Utah Power and its customers will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue. 
"Irreparable harm" has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court to include ''wrongs of a repeated 
and continuous character, or which occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture and not by 
any accurate standard..." Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67 (Utah 1999). In the instant case, the harm that 
would be suffered by Utah Power and, indirectly, by Utah Power's customers, is the inability to access 
the Winchester Hills Subdivision for purposes of inspecting, operating and maintaining the substation. 
While there is an apparent necessity to perform these functions, of a more immediate note would be the 
inability of Utah Power to access this substation in the event of an electrical emergency such as a power 
outage. The wrong committed by Tolman in preventing access to the substation is of a "repeated and 
continuing character" and the damages which would be occasioned as a result of this continuing wrong 
can be "estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard". Thus, the first element 
justifying injunctive relief is present. 
B. The threatened and occurring injury to Utah Power outweighs any damage the injunction 
may cause Eaglebrook or Tolman. 
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While the continuing injury resulting to Utah Power and its customers as result of Tolman's 
blocking of access to the substation is clear, it is not apparent what, if any, damage might be suffered by 
Tolman when access is restored. Presumably, Tolman's concerns regard safety, although there is no 
evidence that safety is jeopardized by Utah Power's use of this access. Hence, relative injury weighs 
heavily in favor of Utah Power's need to access the Winchester Hills Substation. 
C. The injunction requested would not be adverse to the public interest. 
This element is of particular prominence in this case. We are dealing here with a public electric 
utility charged with the duties and responsibilities of delivering and maintaining electrical power to the 
public. The services that are jeopardized by Tolman's wrongdoing are heavily relied upon by the public 
in their daily lives. It is hard to imagine a service that goes more to the public good. Certainly, there is 
no foreseeable consequence of the issuance of the requested injunction that could be construed to be 
adverse to the public interest. 
D. There is a substantial likelihood that Utah Power will prevail on the merits of the 
underlvine claim. 
1. The actions of the parties subsequent to the execution of the Warranty Deed 
provide the description of the easement sufficient to complete a binding and 
enforceable easement grant. 
At the time of the execution of the Warranty Deed, the parties were uncertain as to where the 
ultimate access easement to the substation would be located. Consequently, the language of the Deed as 
it pertains to the access easement leaves the precise location of the easement to a subsequent 
determination. This "floating easement" is nonetheless enforceable by reason of the parties' subsequent 
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actions which defined the location of the ultimate easement. See Evans v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Utah County, 97 P.3d 697 (Utah App. 2004); Salt Lake City v. J. B. and R. E. 
Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953). In Evans, the deed in question reserving an easement to the 
grantor made references to existing landmarks but left the ultimate route open to subsequent 
determination. In holding the easement nonetheless enforceable, the Court placed primary importance 
upon the intentions of the parties regarding which estates in land the parties intended to be the 
subservient and dominant estates, as well as the purpose of the easement. With respect to the ultimate 
location of the easement, the Evans court held as follows: 
''When a deed containing an easement grant does not fix the 
location of the easement, the grant constitutes a 'floating' 
or 'roving' easement, the location of which may be fixed by 
agreement of the parties, by the acquiescent use of a 
particular way for a considerable period of time, or by one 
party in whom the grant vests the right of selection or the 
right to fix the grant, or where the rule of necessity 
determines the location because any other place would enul, 
ruin or militate against the grant." At pages 702, 703. 
In the instant case, the added language of the Warranty Deed clearly reflects the parties' intention 
that an access easement is created, that the dominant estate is the substation location, and that the 
subservient estate is the adjacent land owned by Eaglebrook. Tolman and Eaglebrook identified the 
precise location of access easement to the substation which was asserted to by Utah Power, almost 
immediately following the execution of the Warranty Deed. This easement was utilized by Utah Power 
during the construction of the substation, and continued to be utilized by Utah Power to inspect, operate 
and maintain the substation for some 12 or 13 years with the acquiescence of Tolman and Eaglebrook. 
This usage by acquiescence of the extension of Winchester Drive running south of Lot 105 to access the 
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Winchester Hills Substation for an extended period of time provided the necessary description of the 
easement so as to make the grant of this easement binding and enforceable. 
2. Tolman and Eaglebrook are equitably estopped from denying the existence of the access 
easement. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked when the following elements are present: (1) 
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) reasonable action by 
the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. See 
Celebrity Club, Inc., v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979); CECO 
Corporation v. Concrete Specialists. Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (1989). In other words, a party may be estopped 
from taking a position where an inconsistent position was previously represented and the opposing party 
relied upon such representation to its detriment. This doctrine was employed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the context of an easement dispute in Premium Oil Company v. Cedar City, 187 P.2d 199, 112 
Utah 324 (1947). In Premium Oil, the Court employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny the 
existence of an easement, but the underlying principle has application in the instant case. The City of 
Cedar City had invested monies in the improvement of lands with the acquiescence of the then adjacent 
property owner. A subsequent owner of these adjacent lands sought to impose an easement across the 
improved lands. In denying this claim of easement, the Court stated: 
"As far as individuals are concerned, their acts and conduct can be such as 
to estop them from enforcing their rights. The municipality may be 
estopped to assert a dedication by acts and conduct which have been relied 
on by others to their prejudice. Likewise, a private individual may be 
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estopped in the same way as where he stands by the permits others to 
expend money in building on land claimed to have been dedicated.***" 
at 112 Utah 324, 330. 
In the instant case, based upon Tolman's representation that the substation would be accessed 
by the extension of Winchester Drive, Utah Power contributed some $3000-$3500 toward the grading 
and surfacing of this road. Thereafter, Utah Power used this road for some 12 or 13 years without 
objection by Tolman. By reason of this reasonable reliance upon Tolman's original representation, and 
the subsequent expenditure of funds toward the construction of the access road, Tolman is now estopped 
from contending that Utah Power may not use this road to access its substation. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth herein, Utah Power has conclusively shown that it has met the four-part test for the 
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. 
Dated this (^kfoi/lf^/j\ 2005. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: 
Williams Ronnow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2681) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-7379 
Fax: (801)328-0537 
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435)628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. Q S O S O O S ^ 
Judge 
Plaintiff PacifiCorp, dba Utah Power ("Utah Power"), hereby moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 
65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction 
restraining and enjoining Defendants Eaglebrook Corporation and R. C. Tolman from interfering with 
Utah Power's access to its Winchester Hills Substation via the existing paved extension of Winchester 
Drive. This Motion is based upon, and is supported by, the Complaint filed herewith, the Affidavit of 
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Dennis K. Smith, the Affidavit of Greg Bean, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
submitted herewith. 
DATED this Syof ; 2005. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
D. Williams Ronnow, 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
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AFFIDAVIT OF GREG BBAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ca 
COUNTY OF SEVIER. ) 
GREG BEAN, being fin* duty «wom, hereby depose* and state*: 
1. 1 an «npkj>^ by PaolflCon), doing bn*fncwisUt^ Power (*TTt^  
Field BrigftwcrititfoMd in Richfield, UUb- I was IboSubstatfonPiojeot Manager 
during the installation of Utah Power's Winchester HiJIs Substadon in Washington 
County, Utah. 
2. fo the lata l ^ l o a i t l c i i ^ r o m e e t a ^ ^ 
CtaanisaioflduriittWln^UtahPow^^ 
property thro owned by Mr, R- C Totman (TebriBnT, or Ws comply, EajdabrooJc 
CesporattaC^aglebiDolO. lntoeofltatfoftbaiadteouBdo^fcwaaaJsopn^ 
that Utah Power upgrade oonsiriiet, operate and mainlainaaubatatUmettlaiilend. 
intimately, a site 6 r d* substation was approved, 
3. I am farroUarwtti the WamntyDeed attaeboi » B»Hbit A 1 ^ wWoh Totaaan'a 
corporation. Eagkbrook Corporation ("Eaglet***"). MnvojwtoUtahPowacatract 
ttf landwinHm tha WiacheataHiUa 8 » b ^ 
4. *ts»ilii»tfttitaMo^ 
tolh»«*atatioowouUlietocawd. Accordingly.«haWatiantyDeadcontained the 
MJowtogleroiiaga^GranW^ 
WVrfairfttalaterdate. AeeeeswIllbeanexteaialenofWia^^ 
i*r"ww w»9*m rromcir p icicnntm MMIUIII 1-194 r.y^wi •—••* 
MHBHDDB MED 10HB AM J n , IWLDO FAX WX 801fcb*0637 P, I 
South of Lot 105, Winchester Httb Phase O, and extending in a Southeasterly 
direction to the above property." 
i . SJwrtryJbUowiogtheacacutoma^ 
Tdmacwboreprasert^tomehwratcmtoro^ 
from ta Am tenainui to access the substation. Mr. Tainan fcquastad that Utah 
Power contribute eae^udf of 8 * cost tf^ 
6. Utah Powec agreed to contribute, and did contribute, one-half the eoil of tht 
extension ofWincbeatw Ddv* (J3000.$3500)wluoh was used to grade the road and 
lay Qie road bate, AnaehedherretoMExhibttBwan^abowlBglocatiooiofLot 
10S,fcewaaisionofWiDeb«tCTDrrv^ 
Ihe location of Tebaaa's hone. 
7. Pdbwingtheinstaawonofnwexie^^ 
tiwiofdafisceettiotbtsutaUvioiisto FbUowinf 
completion of the coMtnictiono^^ 
wed the extension to Wbwhestar Drive for purpose* of operating, inepeoting and 
mamtatning the Winchester Hills Subdivision. 
8. Aiiemepoint,TolmanpavcdtbeeoctcnfionwWnujl>e^ 
onlb«awnalotnortbofthowiwAertcrHilla&^ib»tatir^ 
9. I am Informed that r a o c ^ Mr. T o l ^ 
Power's continued we of the extension to Wmcnester Drive at access to III 
Winchester Httle Substation. 
MUBVI 
NAR-30-20DS WED 10>1? AH „oNES, HALDO FAX NO. 801*3)0637 P. 04 
DATED THIS 2?* day of Man*. 2005, 
My ODmrnttsfon Bxpiivt: 
MOM 
OrnfBeoaJ 
NOTARY P U B L I C ^ 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS K. SMITH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) ' J*-
DENNIS K. SMITH, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am an employee of PacifiCorp, doing business as Utah Power ("Utah Power"), as 
a Substation Foreman for Utah Power's Southern Region, which includes Washington County, Utah. 
2. I am familiar with, and have jurisdiction over, the Winchester Hills Substation 
located in the City of St. George and shown on the map attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. I am also familiar with the Warranty Deed (Exhibit B attached hereto) whereby, on 
April 12, 1991, Eaglebrook Corporation, through its president, R.C. Tolman, conveyed to Utah 
Power the lot or lots in Winchester Hills Subdivision to be utilized for a Substation. This Warranty 
Deed also conveyed an undefined access easement to the Substation as follows: "Grantor also 
warrants that access to the above property will be negotiated at a later date. Access will be an 
extension of Winchester Drive running South of Lot 105, Winchester Hills Phase II, and extending 
in a Southeasterly direction to the above property." 
4. I oversaw the installation of the Winchester Hills Substation, which was completed 
on April 1, 1992. During this construction period, and consistent with the Warranty Deed, access 
to the Substation site was provided by an extension of Winchester Drive running south of Lot 105 
as shown on the map, Exhibit A. 
5. Following the installation of the Substation, service, maintenance, and inspection 
of the Winchester Hills Substation similarly was accessed by the aforestated extension of Winchester 
Drive. 
6. At some time after the installation of the Substation, R.C. Tolman built his home 
on a lot immediately north the Utah Power property (see Exhibit A). In conjunction with the 
construction of his home, Mr. Tolman paved the extension of Winchester Drive to his property. 
Utah Power participated in the cost of the paving of this road. 
7. Approximately six or seven months ago, I met with Mr. Tolman at the Substation. 
At the conclusion of this meeting, Mr. Tolman advised me that Utah Power could no longer use the 
paved extension to Winchester Drive as access to its Substation. Rather, Mr. Tolman insisted that 
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access be obtained via a rudimentary dirt road running to the south and east of the extension to 
Winchester Drive. At the conclusion of the meeting, I used this dirt road in exiting the Substation 
and found that it would be impassable for larger vehicles and vehicles without four-wheel drive. As 
such, the dirt road is not suitable access to the Substation. 
8. Since the date of this meeting, Utah Power has attempted to negotiate a resolution, 
but Mr. Tolman continues to refuse to allow Utah Power to access the Substation by way of the 
extension to Winchester Drive. Mr. Tolman has posted a sign at the entrance to the extension of 
Winchester Drive which reads as follows: "No Utah Power Trucks or Equipment on Private 
Driveway." 
9. It is necessary for Utah Power to have suitable access byway of the paved extension 
of Winchester Drive to the Substation to maintain and inspect the Substation on an ongoing basis. 
In addition, in the event of a power failure or outage, it is imperative that Utah Power have access 
on an immediate basis to the Substation by way of the paved extension to Winchester Drive. 
Without such access, Utah Power and its customers will suffer immediate and irreparable harm. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 2005. 
^^i^^<A 
DENNIS K. SMITH 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
:ss. 
) 
On this 25th day of March, 2005, personally appeared before me DENNIS K. SMITH, known 
to me (or satisfactorily proven) to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to on this 
instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
JULIE BRINTON 
mmmiC'SWEefm 
301 N. 200 E SUITE 3-A 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
C0MM. EXP. 1-20-2006 
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Exhibit A 
LAVA BLUFF SUBDIVISION 
PRELIMINARY PLAT 1 3 9 L R. POPE ENGINEERS & 
SURVEYORS 
285 W TABERNACLE. S1E 305. ST. GCORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 8 3 4 - 7 6 7 6 
*4SL 
Exhibit B 
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January 10, 1991 RUSSELL SHIRTS * UASHIWTON CO RECORDER 
Page 1 of 2 mi APR 15 11*34 AH TEE *S.OO BY JLJ 
REQUEST^ WASHINGTON COUNTY TITLE CO 
WARRANTY DEED 
Eaglebrook Corporation, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
principal office in the County of Washington , State of Utah, 
Grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to PacifiCorp, an Oregon 
corporation, dba Utah Power & Light Company, whose principal 
place of business is located at 1407 West North Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other good and 
valuable consideration, the following described real property 
in Washington County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
A tract of land situate in the NWl/4 of the 
SW1/4 of Section 24, Township 41 South, Range 16 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, described as follows: 
TOWCIOTC* & Beginning at a point S.82°06'34WB, 1332.4 
\JA f e e t from the west one quarter corner of Sec t ion 24, T. 41 S . , R. 16 W., S.L.W-, thence S.0°15'45ME. 
513.00 f e e t , more or l e s s , thence S.89°44 /15 f ,W. 
170.00 f e e t thence N.0M5'45f,W. 513.00 f e e t , thence 
N.89*44'15"E. 170.00 f e e t t o the point of beg inning . 
Containing 2 .0 a c r e s , more or l e s s . *** SEE BELOW 
The o f f i c e r s who s i g n t h i s deed hereby c e r t i f y tha t 
t h i s deed and the t r a n s f e r represented thereby was duly 
authorized under a r e s o l u t i o n duly adopted by the board of 
d i r e c t o r s of the Grantor at a lawful meeting duly h e l d and 
attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused i t s 
corporate name and s e a l t o be hereunto a f f i x e d by i t s duly 
*** Grantor also warrants that access to the' d*/**/ 
above property v i l l be negotiated at a later n ^ ' 
date* Access will be an extension of tM&t^ 
— Winchester Drive runing South of Lot 105, ur 
DOCUMENT* amASa\Tt\U\ntSD\WlNHaJS 
Winchester Hi l l s Phase 11, and extending in 
a Southeastedy-kfircction to the abovo property. ft* 
WD CORP FUR-6/90 
FN 
January 10,1991 
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authorized o f f i c e r s t h i s 
19 91 . 
•12th day of April 
Eaglebrook Corporation 
By /L<^ ^^w^Lj 
President 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
) 
:ss. 
) 
On the 12TH day of „Ai?ri 1 
R. C. TOLMAN 
19-fiJLr 
personally appeared before me 
who being by me duly sworn did sayf that he/sher is the 
PRESIDENT of Eaglebrook Corporation, and 
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf 
of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board 
of directors and said R. C» TOLMAN duly 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and 
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
My C< 
LYNETTE Y. BINGHAM { 
STUborge, U&h Q477C | 
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Rob Graham & Associates 
7375 W. Peak Drive 
Suite 220 
Las Vegas, NV 89128 
(702)255-6161 
Invoice submitted to: 
R.C. Toleman 
920 W. 5484 North 
St. George UT 84770 
January 04, 2006 
nvoice #40163 
In Reference To; Easement Dispute 
Professional Services 
Hours Amount 
715/2005 - RCG Meeting with client and review easement dispute documents; 
prepare conflict letter and open file. 
9/6/2005 - MB Review of file 
- MB Revise letter to Atty. Kampton. 
3/772005 - RCG Revise demand letter and review outline of Motion to Remove 
Preliminary Injunction with Atty. Brow; Review affidavit points and 
factual highlights to support Motion; Related activity. 
- MB 
- MB 
te/2005 - MB 
'9/20O5 - MB 
Revise letter. 
Meeting with Atty. Graham; Begin preparing Petition. 
Preparation of pleadings: Petition to Set Aside Preliminary 
Injunction. 
Preparation of pleadings: continue work on Petition to Set Aside 
Preliminary Injunction 
0.60 105.00 
1.00 NO CHARGE 
1.00 
0.50 
0.10 
1.00 
3.50 
150.00 
87.50 
15.00 
150.00 
525.00 
1.50 225.00 
0.63 173.25 5/20O5 - ER Review file. 
3/20O5 - ER Began draft of Motion and Order for Utah Power Case; Reviewed 2 00 550 00 
requirements for Pro Hac Vice Application and filled out application 
for Rob. 
72005 - ER Obtained copy of the pleading filed by Utah Power; Reviewed all 2.25 618.75 
pleadings; Researched position taken by Utah Power. 
R,C, Toleman 
12/8/2005 - ER Research and edit Motion to Set Aside. 
12/9/2005 - ER Continue research and draft of Motion to Set Aside. 
Review position on matter with RCG. 12/12/2005 - ER 
12/27/2005 - ER Telephone call with RCG regarding documents received from 
Review correspondence; Discuss strategy for upcoming motion and 
hearing; Review new documents and pictures provided by Review 
correspondence Tolman. 
„F_QLprofessional services rendered 
Balance due 
Page 2 
-(fours Amount' 
2-50 687.50 
2.10 577.50 
0.25 68.75 
0 75 206.25 
19.68 $4,139.50 
$4,139.50 
********** ********** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * « 
count Is charged at an hourly rate, plus costs. 
******* ********** ********** ********** ********** 
b Graham & Associates accepts VISA/MC/AMEX. 
ng errors must be submitted IN WRITING within thirty (30) days or error may be disallowed. 
)U have questions regarding your bill, please call (702) 255-6161. Calling does not reserve your rights. 
Rob Graham & Associates 
7375 W. Peak Drive 
Suite 220 
Las Vegas, NV 89128 
(702)255-6161 
Invoice submitted to 
R C. Toleman 
920 W. 5484 North 
St George UT 84770 
/larch 03, 2006 
lvoice #40384 
In Reference To: Easement Dispute 
Professional Services 
/12/2006 - ER Telephone message for Mr. Tolman's call. 
2/6/2006 - RCG Attend to preparation of exhibit photos for court and highlight 
easement on roads for demonstrative purposes; Follow up on status 
of new court hearing 
'22/2006 
24/2006 
RCG Followup on status of exhibit supplements for court hearing 
SB Review petition to set aside preliminary injunction and supporting 
docs.; prepare docs for filing with court and mailing to opposing 
court; appearance at court to file docs. 
For professional services rendered-
Additional Charges * 
!2/2006 - SB Fax 
'3/2006 - SB Copying cost 
-Hours Amount 
010 
0 50 
0 30 
0.80 
17.50 
87 50 
52.50 
100 00 
1;76 $ 2 5 7 T 5 0 
Qtv/Price 
6 
1.00 
2 
83F 
6.00 
0.50 
rvf.y.-trtr, j^rr.-^ s ^•y^.rf-.yw^^ v^^v^- r r *-• .T^r^* rr ry . jwfr -y ' 
4/2006 - SB Copying cost 
SB Postage 
140 
0.25 
1 
2.70 
35.00 
2.70 
R.C. Toleman 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
1/10/2006 Credit Card (Visa) Payment - Thank You 
Total payments and adjustments 
Balance due 
>++**+*+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *++** * *+* 
count is charged at an hourly rate, plus costs. 
* * + » * • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
b Graham & Associates accepts VISA/MC/AMEX. 
ing errors must be submitted IN WRITING within thirty (30) days or error may be disallowed. 
DU have questions regarding your bill, please call (702) 255-6161. Calling does not reserve your rights. 
Page 2 
Amount 
$44.20 
$301.70 
$4,139.50 
(34,139.50) 
($4,139.50) 
—£301.70 
TabC 
f 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. (#8343) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 986-8200 
Facsimile: (435) 673-8999 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050500546 
PETITION TO SET ASIDE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
Comes now Defendant, R.C. TOLMAN and EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, by and 
through his counsel of record, Eric S. Rodriguez, Esq., and by way of this Petition asks this Court 
to set aside the Preliminary Injunction entered against him on April 25,2005, and to grant R.C. 
TOLMAN and EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION permission to file an opposition to the Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction. 
/// 
1 
200SFEP 2U PH h 52 
H* :h, - ' J u l I 
< . . , . -IP*. 
This Petition is based upon the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 
the Affidavit of R.C. Tolman, and any oral arguments that might be entertained at Court. 
Dated this M% of February 2006 
ERICXftODRIGUEZ 
Attorney for Defendants 
2 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. (#8343) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 986-8200 
Facsimile: (435) 673-8999 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an 
Defendants. 
an Oregon 
a Utah 
individual, 
Case No. 050500546 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION TO 
SET ASIDE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
This action brought by Eaglebrook Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Eaglebrook") 
and R.C. Tolman (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Tolman") individually, seeking an order from 
the court to set aside the preliminary injunction granted to Utah Power on April 25,2005. 
/// 
/// 
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1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Eaglebrook Corporation is an entity that develops land and has other interest in the 
State of Utah. 
2. R.C. Tolman is an individual who resides in Washington County, State of Utah. 
3. On January 10, 1991, Utah Power purchased from Mr. Tolman a two-acre site in 
Winchester Hills for the purpose of building aN electric power substation. Concurrently, Mr. 
Tolman granted an easement by warranty deed to Utah Power so that it would have access to the 
substation. See Exhibit A which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
4. The warranty deed provides that "(A)ccess will be an extension of Winchester Drive 
running South of Lot 105, Winchester Hills Phase II, and extending in a Southeasterly direction 
to the above property." 
5. At the time of the above mention agreement, the paved Private Driveway of Mr. 
Tolman (hereinafter referred to as "Private Driveway") currently being adversely used by Utah 
Power was not in existence. When the warranty deed was executed by the parties, only one dirt 
road existed in the area connecting to the substation. This road (hereinafter referred to as "D-1") 
had access from Winchester Drive (going directly south) and extending to the location of the 
substation through an easterly path. Another dirt road (hereinafter referred to as "D-2") was 
north of the current Private Driveway but did not connect to the substation. D-2 is no longer in 
existence, and on current maps, remnants of this road can be seen just north of the newer Private 
Driveway. 
/// 
2 
6. When the warranty deed was executed, it was understood by Mr. Tolman and 
Pacific Corporation dba Utah Power (hereinafter referred to as "Utah Power"), that D-l which 
extended to the substation was the easement and no other path led to the substation. The 
executed warranty deed did not include D-2 , which is no longer in existence, or the Private 
Driveway, as this road did not even exist at the time of the execution of the warranty deed. The 
attached photograph exhibits should assist the Court in determining the actual easement in 
question. See Exhibit B which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. As recorded in the warranty deed, the easement was an "extension of Winchester 
Drive running South (emphasis added) of Lot 105, Winchester Hills Phase II, and extending in a 
Southeasterly direction to the above property." As the Private Driveway did not exist at the time 
and the D-S was not South of Lot 105, the process of elimination leaves only D-l as the 
easement. 
8. Utah Power used D-l to access the substation for five years after the execution of 
the warranty deed. During those five years, Utah Power did not use D-2 to Mr. Tolman's 
knowledge nor was the Private Driveway used in various stages of development. 
9. In 1993, Mr. Tolman constructed his residence on the property. Indeed, the Court 
should not lose sight that the property on which the substation was located was residential in 
nature and the substation plot was sold as an accommodation to the power company. Apparently 
now the green eyed guest has decided to have the run of the place! The Tolman home was built 
near the spot where D-2 dead-ended. Three years later in 1996, Mr. Tolman laid down 594 tons 
of asphalt on what is now the new Private Driveway, creating his own personal driveway from 
/// 
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the end of Winchester Drive to his residence. Prior to the completion of this Private Driveway, 
D-l was the primary access to the substation. 
10. After Mr. Tolman constructed the Private Driveway, Mr. Tolman paid to have 
Utah Power lay electricity for a subdivision located south of the Private Driveway. It was at this 
time that Utah Power began to use the Private Driveway as it was doing work on the subdivision. 
11. In 1996, following the completion of the Private Driveway, Utah Power stopped 
using the agreed upon easement altogether and began using the driveway to access the substation. 
Mr. Tolman could not distinguish between the work on the subdivision and non-related work. 
12. Mr. Tolman was subsequently informed that the power to his proposed subdivision 
could not be put in until he had recorded his subdivision with the Court, and all work on his 
project stopped. What did not stop, however, was the Utah Power trucks speeding down his 
newly paved Private Driveway. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Tolman formally requested that Utah 
Power use the established easement instead of the Private Driveway. See Exhibit C which is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. This problem became more serious 
when Mr. Tolman's two three-year old grandchildren moved in with him. The two little girls 
ride their tricycles on the driveway on almost a daily basis, and use of the driveway by the large 
Utah Power trucks presents an obvious and immediate danger to the small children. 
13. Once Mr. Tolman's granddaughters moved into his residence, Mr. Tolman 
demanded that Utah Power cease and desist use of the driveway. When the company ignored 
him, Mr. Tolman put up 6<No Trespassing" signs and blocked off the driveway with a chain. 
Despite his efforts, Utah Power continued to trespass upon the driveway and suddenly began to 
4 
claim that it, in fact, was the easement. As time went on, the true easement of D-1 gradually fell 
into disrepair. 
14. Because Utah Power failed to maintain the easement on D-1, it now claims that 
the road is "impassable" and "rudimentary." Utah Power has only Utah Power to blame for the 
poor condition of the easement. 
15. Utah Power used D-1 for the five years prior to the construction of Mr. Tolman's 
paved Private Driveway. The sudden and convenient change from a rural dirt road easement to a 
paved residential driveway does not benefit the public. It benefits only the drivers of the Utah 
Power trucks as the road is smooth and access is very convenient. Perhaps, too convenient to 
resist. 
16. On April 1, 2005, Utah Power filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief along with an Affidavit of Dennis K. Smith, an Affidavit of Greg Bean, a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. 
17. The entire action was done Ex Parte as Mr. Tolman received no notice. On 
April 25, 2005, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction in favor of Utah Power, and Mr. 
Tolman's rights were tossed aside like a rag doll. 
18. As a result of the lack of notice of service, as evidenced by the Court's own log 
(see Exhibit D which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference), the 
Defendants were not able to present a defense to the baseless factual claims of the Plaintiff. Had 
/// 
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Mr. Tolman been able to speak, as is his right under state and federal law, the Court would have 
heard an entirely different story. 
19. A hearing was held on April 14, 2005, in front of the Honorable Eric C. Ludlow. 
According to the minutes from the Court, Utah Power was represented by Anthony L. Rampton. 
Neither of the Defendants had an opportunity to be present and make arguments. The Court 
heard discussion and it held that Utah Power had met its burden of proof, and as a result, the 
Court granted the injunction in favor of Utah Power. If the Court was informed that notice was 
given, then someone needs to apologize to the Court. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The governing authority on injunctions and temporary restraining orders is Rule 65A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, an injunction or a temporary restraining order 
may be issued upon the applicant showing that: (1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm 
unless the order or injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs 
whatever the damage the proposed order of injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) the order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse tot he public interest; and (4) there is a 
substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the 
case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of the further litigation. 
The party seeking the injunction must meet all four of the elements as outlined by Rule 
65A for an injunction to issue. See Utah Medical Products. Inc., v. Searcy. 958 P.2d 231. 
/// 
/// 
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A. Mr. Tolman's due process rights have been violated because he never received 
service of process and the opportunity to be heard in court. 
Utah Power brought a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Eaglebrook and Mr. 
Tolman. In plain violation of due process, Utah Power never bothered to serve Mr. Tolman 
individually or as the registered agent for Eaglebrook with a summons or copy of the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. The Court's log (see Exhibit D) does not show that an Affidavit of 
Service was filed. In fact, the case log does not show that any type of service was effectuated on 
the Defendants. As a result of Utah Power's failure to provide notice, Mr. Tolman was never 
aware that any action had been brought against himand did not appear before the Court, 
individually or on behalf of Eaglebrook, when the matter was heard. Because Mr. Tolman was 
not present at the hearing, the Court approved the preliminary injunction against Mr. Tolman, 
essentially granting injunctive relief on an ex parte basis. Later, on August 9, 2005, Mr. Tolman 
was served with a copy of the order by a Washington County Sheriff, which was the first he had 
even heard of the matter. Defendants' counsel finally obtained a copy of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction from the Court on December 7, 2005. 
The United States Supreme Court has held: "In the absence of service of process (or 
waiver of service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the 
complaint names as defendant." Murphy Bros.. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.. 526 U.S. 
344, 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322, 143 L.Ed.2d 448 (1999). Utah statutes and case law concur. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 65 A provides, "No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice 
to the adverse party." Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that "no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although the exact 
7 
requirements of due process may vary from situation to situation, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the minimum requirements of due process include adequate notice and an opportunity 
to be heard in a meaningful manner. See Dairy Prod. Servs.. Inc. v. City of Wellsville. 2000 UT 
81 at ^ 49,13P.3d581. 
B. Under Rule 65 A, Utah Power fails to meet the standard of irreparable harm. 
Utah Power and Mr. Tolman were clear about the intended easement at the time the 
easement was made. This is evidenced by the existence of only one road accessing the substation 
at the time and confirmed by Utah Power's use of D-l for the first five years after the execution 
the warranty deed. Only when it became more convenient to use Mr. Tolman's paved Private 
Driveway did Utah Power stop using the true easement. The only thing "floating" in this case is 
the Plaintiffs use of the facts to get its way on an Ex Parte Petition. 
Furthermore, public policy favors the rejection of the preliminary injunction. Utah Power 
will suffer no legitimate harm from using the easement because it has an established easement 
and a right of way to the substation. It is important consider that the entire area at issue is quite 
small, relatively speaking. Utah Power only has to travel an extra 300 feet or so to get to the 
substation via the easement as opposed to the Private Driveway. The importance of preventing 
Utah Power's large trucks from roaring down a driveway where two little girls constantly play 
easily outweighs any inconvenience Utah Power faces by traveling an extra 300 feet each trip. 
The death of a small child caused by one of the large speeding vehicles would cause an 
immediate outcry from the community. The public's interest is in protecting our children, not 
protecting truck drivers from bumpy roads. 
/// 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court must set aside the Preliminary Injunction and allow Mr. Tolman and 
Eaglebrook the opportunity to be heard because their fundamental property rights have been and 
continue to be violated. Not^nrty floes Utah Power continue to trespass upon the property and 
place Mr. Tolman's grandchildren in danger, but the company now has violated Mr. Tolman's 
due process rights by obtaining injunctive relief without serving Mr. Tolman notice or giving him 
a change to be heard. Utah Power's actions have been reckless and cavalier, and this Court needs 
to set matters straight. As for the merits of the case, the history of Utah Power's use of the 
easement will demonstrate that Mr. Tolman and Eaglebrook, and not Utah Power, would prevail 
on the merits of the underlying claim. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Mr. Tolman and Eaglebrook demand that this Court set aside 
the Preliminary Injunction. Further, should this Court determine that notice and an opportunity 
to be heard should have been given, the attorney's fees in the amount of One Thousand No/100 
Dollars ($1,000.00) should be granted as this is the additional work that had to be performed to 
dig through the Court records to determine what had transpired without the knowledge of the 
Defendants. 
Dated t h i s 3 M ^ y o f February 2006 ^ 
ERIC ^RODRIGUEZ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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January 10, 1991 RUSSELL SHIRTS * UASHJWTQN CO RECORDER 
Page 1 of 2 Wl APR 15 11?3* AH FEE $8.00 BY JLJ 
REQUEST: UASH1NGT0N COUNTY TITLE CO 
WARRANTY DEED 
Eaglebrook Corporation, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utahf with its 
principal office in the County of Washington , State of Utah, 
Grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to PacifiCorp, an Oregon 
corporation, dba Utah Power & Light Company, whose principal 
place of business is located at 1407 West North Temple, Salt 
Lake Cityr Utah, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other good and 
valuable consideration, the following described real property 
in Washington County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
A tract of land situate in the NW1/4 of the 
SW1/4 of Section 24, Township 41 South, Range 16 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, described as follows: 
TOISCWUOM & Beginning at a point S. 82°06' 34"B. 1332.4 
IM. f e e t from t h e west one q u a r t e r c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 24, T. 41 S . , R. 16 W., S.L.M., t h e n c e S.0°15 '45 M £. 
513 .00 f e e t , more o r l e s s , t h e n c e S.89°44' 15"W. 
170 .00 f e e t t h e n c e N.0M5' 45?,W. 513*00 f e e t f t h e n c e 
N. 89*44'15ME. 170.00 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . 
C o n t a i n i n g 2 .0 a c r e s , more br l e s s . **$
 S E j BELOW 
The o f f i c e r s who s i g n t h i s deed he reby c e r t i f y t h a t 
t h i s deed and t h e t r a n s f e r r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e b y was du ly 
a u t h o r i z e d under a r e s o l u t i o n du ly adopted by t h e board of 
d i r e c t o r s of t h e Gran tor a t a l awful meet ing d u l y h e l d and 
a t t e n d e d by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e Grantor h a s caused i t s 
c o r p o r a t e name and s e a l t o be h e r e u n t o a f f i x e d by i t s du ly 
*** Grantor also warrants that access to the" jQy'f^'^ 
above property v i l l be negotiated at a l a t e r /f*^ ' 
date* Access will be an extension of g%M*/' 
, Winchester Drive runing South of Lot 105, \r 
vocvHEta<cADjunvAuw&\wi!*mi3 Winchester Hills Phase I I , and extending in 
a Sout-heastosfy' direction to the above property• R* 
WD CORP FUR-6/90 
FN 
January 10,1991 
Page 2 of 2 
authorized o f f i c e r s t h i s 
19 91 . 
12th day of April 
Eaglebrook Corporation 
By 
President 
STATE OF UTAH, 
CO0NTY OF WASHINGTON 
:$S, 
On the 12TH day of AJITA 1 -' l9-SL.r 
personally appeared before me R. g_. TOLMAN , 
who being by me duly sworn did say, that he/she, is the 
PKESIDENT of Eaglebrook Corporation, and 
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf 
of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board 
of directors and said R, C» TOLMAN
 m duly 
acknowledged to me that: said corporation executed the same and 
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
I LYNETTEY, BINGHAM | 
1 N?»»Y M>iic State of WAK | 
>My Commission Expire* April M, 1993 f Residing i n 
Nottcyry Publ ic 
i.cane, Utah 
Descr ipt ion Approved JB&. 
Fortn & Execution Approved File No. 
DCUMINT; CADAST\FMt\fRED\WJNHILJS 
0 3 8 2 0 5 2 BK 0 5 9 7 Ps 
EXHIBIT B 
Due to computer problems, the photograph exhibits will not be submitted along with this 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Defendants will submit these photographs under a 
separation caption during the week of February 27, 2006. 
EXHIBIT C 
R.C. TOLMAN 
EAGLEBROOK CORP. 
920 W. 5484 N. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
December 15, 2003 
AMANDA NELSON 
Pacific Corp. 
Vice-President Customer Service 
1900 8.4 th Ave. 
Plaza Level 
Portland, Oregon 97201 
Amanda Nelson: 
I acknowledge your December 3, 2003 letter. Your second paragraph where you identify 
the legal description I initialed that gives access to the above property is correct. You 
have your direction wrong (east, west, north and south). 
At the time (January 10, 1991) Utah Power and Light Co. purchased this property the 
only roadway to the old substation and the land covered by the warranty deed is the 
access you described in paragraph two. (Access will be an extension of Winchester 
Drive running south of lot 105, Winchester Hills Phase II and extending in a 
southeasterly direction to the above property). 
After January 10, 1991,1 built my home and my asphalt driveway all on my property, 
(please note: my driveway runs East of lot 105) This shows on the map I sent earlier. 
Please re-advise your local; operational staff to use the legal right of way that is on the 
warranty deed and not to use my private asphalt driveway. 
Also, as I stated before the meter reader may use the private driveway as he drives a 
small pickup and watches out for the children. 
I would like to be working with the legal department as they would understand the legal 
issue, but I have never been given a name or an address to communicate with. 
Thank you, 
R.C. Tolman 
Cc: Judi Johansen, CEO 
EXHIBIT D 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP vs. EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION 
NUMBER 050500546 Miscellaneous 
*ENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ERIC A LUDLOW 
TIES 
Plaintiff - PACIFICORP 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Represented by: ANTHONY L RAMPTON 
Represented by: D. WILLIAM RONNOW 
Doing Business As - UTAH POWER 
Defendant - EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
Defendant - R C TOLMAN 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
5UNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT • 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
163.50 
163.50 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.50 
8.50 
0.00 
0.00 
NOTE 
:EEDINGS 
lted: 02/02/06 11:58:33 Page 1 
I NUMBER 050500546 Miscellaneous 
H-05 Case filed 
H-05 Judge LUDLOW assigned. 
H-05 Filed: Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief 
H-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
H-05 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
H-05 Filed: Affidavit of Dennis K Smith 
H-05 Filed: Affidavit of Greg Bean 
H-05 Filed: Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction 
H-05 Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah 
Power's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction 
(4-05 Issued: Temporary Restraining Order 
Judge ERIC A LUDLOW 
Hearing Date: April 14, 2005 Time: 10:00 
•4-05 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on April 14, 2005 at 10:00 AM in 
Courtroom J with Judge LUDLOW. 
•8-05 Tracking started for Other. Review date Oct 08, 2005. 
.4-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER 
Judge: ERIC A LUDLOW 
Clerk: marshac 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : ANTHONY L RAMPTON 
Video 
Tape Number: 050150 Tape Count: 10:03/10:15 
HEARING 
No appearance by the Defendant or Defendant's Counsel. Discussion 
is held. Court finds that Pacificorp has met its burden of proof. 
Court grants petition. Counsel to prepare the Order. 
6-05 Filed order: Preliminary Injunction 
Judge eludlow 
Signed April 25, 2005 
6-05 Case Disposition is Granted 
Disposition Judge is ERIC A LUDLOW 
9-05 Filed return: Temporary Restraining Order and Return of Service 
Party Served: TOLMAN, R C 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: August 09, 2005 
9-05 Tracking ended for Other. 
7-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.50 
7-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 8.50 
.ted: 02/02/06 11:58:34 Page 2 (last) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, on 7 ^ ^ / 2006, to the following person at the address listed below: 
Anthony L. Rampton, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D. Williams Ronnow, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Susan K. Barone 
TabD 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. (#8343) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 986-8200 
Facsimile: (435) 673-8999 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050500546 
ERRATA TO PETITION TO 
SET ASIDE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
Comes now Defendant, R.C. TOLMAN and EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, by and 
through his counsel of record, Eric S. Rodriguez, Esq., who files the instant Errata to Petition to 
Set Aside Preliminary Injunction, states as follows: 
/// 
/// 
/// 
1 
i f 
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BY V * ^ 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A are the photographs referenced in Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition to Set Aside Preliminary 
Injunction. 
Dated this ( ' c l ay of March 2006 <^L—z-=--^ 
ERIC ^RODRIGUEZ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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EXHIBIT A 
LEGEND 
D-1 Original Easement 
D-2 Land Border Rd. 
Private Driveway 
Current View of Property 
Looking South 
All Roads/Easements Highlighted 
1 
jipBLj,, 
w&**~ 
LEGEND| 
D-1 Original Easement 
D-2 Land Border Rd. 
Private Driveway 
Current View of Property 
Looking South 
USGS Map Highlighted Only 
1999 USGS Map Highlighted 
m-
i 
mrw 
ft TLISGSl 
USGS Map Not Highlighted 
twm*l£**?L*m£ <jtfo 
*> i 
' * ? * ; -
I 
Future Access Road 
(NOT Present) 
Border Drive 
PRESENT 
on Prop 
Future Sub-Statilty 
(NOT Present) \ 
I 
Future Tolman Home 
(NOT Present) 
s Private Drive (NOT Present) 
Circa 1991 Highlighted Photo (Before Tolman Home, 
Private Drive or Sub-Station 
/ 
IF 
Jt 
"SK^ 
Circa 1991 Photo (Before Tolman Home, 
Private Drive or Sub-Station 
TabE 
Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2862) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-7379 
Fax: (801)328-0537 
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435)628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Z006HAR-8 FM 3^09 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION TO SETTING ASIDE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 050500546 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Plaintiff PacifiCorp, dba Utah Power, hereby stipulates to the setting aside of the Preliminary 
Injunction entered on April 25,2005. This stipulation is based upon the fact that, unbeknownst to counsel, 
the Complaint had not been served upon the defendants prior to the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, Plaintiff PacifiCorp hereby requests that a hearing date be set for 
purposes of Plaintiff PacifiCorp's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
734275vl 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2006. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Anthony>l^ Karnpton 
Attorne^ior Plaintiff PacifiCorp 
734275vl 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on March 
6, 2006, to the following person at the address listed below: 
Eric S. Rodriguez, Esq. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, UT 84770 
'<£JK 
734275vl 3 
TabF 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. (#8343) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 986-8200 
Facsimile: (435) 986-9720 
ANTHONY P. WERRETT, ESQ. (#9760) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-0409 
Facsimile: (435) 986-9720 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050500546 
NOTICE OF UTAH SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
The Supreme's Court ruling in Evans v. Board of Countv Commissioners. 123 P.3d 432, 
2005 U.T. 74 (Utah 11/04/2005) is dispositive on the issue presently before this Court. In Evans, 
the Court concluded that the most appropriate method to affix the easement is to assign the 
1 
2005 rpR
 r?5 PH 2: 12 
owner of the servient estate the authority and discretion to designate the easement's location 
pursuant to its stated purpose in the grant. Therefore, pursuant to the precedent set forth in 
Evans, Mr. Tolman, the owner of the servient estate, hereby designates the easement at D-1 (the 
road which leads to the electric power substation in a Southeasterly direction) as originally set 
forth in the executed Warranty Deed and as originally intended and contemplated by the parties. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference is a true and 
correct copy of the Court's decision in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners. 
Dated this 25th day of April, 2006. 
ANTHONY P. WERRETT, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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EXHIBIT A 
2005 UT 74 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Jamie Evans, No. 20040739 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Fourth District, Provo 
The Honorable Fred D. Howard 
No. 960400821 
Attorneys: Alexander Dushku, Daniel J. McDonald, Jason W. 
Beutler, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Craig V. Wentz, Barton H. Kunz, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
NEHRING, Justice: 
11 Jamie Evans claims an easement over land owned by the 
Board of County Commissioners of Utah County. The court of 
appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment finding that 
Mr. Evans's easement was too vague to be enforced. We affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
12 In 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded the Ironton 
Plat, a subdivision located in Utah County. The plat is roughly 
rectangular in shape with its length running north to south. 
Eight east-to-west streets dedicated to public use divide the 
plat into seven blocks upon which lots are laid out. Pine Street 
is the southernmost of these streets. In 1935, the State of Utah 
realigned Highway 89 to traverse the length of the west side of 
the plat as part of its route from Provo City to Springville 
City. Pine Street, which intersects Highway 89, is the only of 
the Ironton streets to feature prominently in this appeal. 
F I L E D 
November 4, 2005 
13 At a later date, R.L. Bird Company acquired land within 
the Ironton Plat immediately south of Pine Street along with 
several additional lots located along the plat's eastern 
boundary. Bird also obtained title to a substantial tract of 
land surrounding the southeast corner of the plat, which we will 
call the corner property. The corner property abutted the strip 
of land Bird owned south of Pine Street and the lots Bird owned 
on the east boundary of the plat. 
14 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interest in its land 
within the plat, the strip south of Pine Street and the lots, to 
Utah County. Bird8 retained ownership of the corner property and, 
as part of the conveyance to Utah County, reserved an easement 
and right-of-way over the strip and Pine Street to provide access 
to the corner property from Highway 89. The reservation read: 
Reserving to the grantor the public use and 
right-of-way over and into Pine Street from 
the State Highway and a 56* wide right-of-way 
over and across the last parcel of land 
[included in the quit claim deed (the 
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with 
grantor's remaining property over which Utah 
County agrees to build a good gravel road 
within 90 days of the date of this instrument 
to provide access to grantor's remaining 
land. 
15 As of the date Utah County acquired Bird's interest in 
the plat the subdivision had not been developed and the dedicated 
streets, including Pine Street, had not been constructed. Utah 
County subsequently built a public works facility comprised of a 
public works building, a service station, and a parking lot on 
part of its property within Ironton Plat. It also vacated three 
streets at the plat's south end, but did not vacate Pine Street. 
Although Pine Street retained its status as a dedicated street, 
Utah County removed a substantial amount of earth in and around 
it in the course of building the public works facility. 
16 In 1995, Bird conveyed the corner property, including 
the easement and right-of-way to Jamie and Terry Evans.1 The 
Evanses sued Utah County seeking, among other forms of relief not 
relevant to this appeal, enforcement of the easement. Utah 
1
 The original deed conveying the corner property from Bird 
to the Evanses did not refer to the easement. Bird later filed a 
corrected deed that did describe the easement and right-of-way. 
This course of events is not germane, however, to this appeal. 
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County resisted the enforceablity of the easement on the grounds 
that the deed did not identify its location with sufficient 
specificity. The trial court agreed. 
17 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed. It 
characterized the grant in the deed as an enforceable "floating" 
easement. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f8 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, 1 11, 103 P.3d 699. Our review is for correctness, 
and we grant no deference to the court of appeals' opinion. 
ANALYSIS 
59 The court of appeals determined that the absence of a 
description of the location of the easement in the Evans deed did 
not amount to a fatal omission of an essential term. It reached 
this conclusion after analyzing its features as a "floating" or 
"roving" easement. The court drew the term "floating or roving 
easement" from Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 253 P. 2d 
365, 368 (1953), where we used it to describe an easement grant 
that does not fix the location of the easement 
but which may be fixed by agreement of the 
parties, the [acquiescent] use of the parties 
in a particular way . . . for a considerable 
period of time, or by one party in whom the 
grant vests the right of selection or the 
right to fix the grant, or where the rule of 
necessity determines the location because any 
other place would annul, ruin or militate 
against the grant. 
Id. at 368. 
110 Although the court of appeals' analytical approach was, 
in many respects, equal to the task of properly resolving the 
issue before it, the floating easement definition used in Walker 
did not account for the factual circumstance we face here: no 
express description of the location of the Evanses' easement and 
no vesting in anyone the authority to position the easement. 
511 We have chosen to follow a different course than that 
taken by the court of appeals, but one that reaches the same 
3 No. 20040739 
result. Our approach is one that we believe tests more directly 
and reliably the merits of the County's claim that an express 
term in the Evanses' deed fixing the location of the easement on 
the strip was essential to its enforceability. 
?12 Guiding and informing our approach to ascertaining 
whether the Evanses' easement description contained all essential 
terms is the core principle that the burden of the servitude must 
be communicated to the owner of the servient estate with 
sufficient clarity to understand it. The principle is an 
application to easements of the basic concepts of the law of 
contracts that the duties of a party to a contract must be 
described in detail sufficient to make it possible to ascertain 
whether the agreement has been kept or broken. Nielsen v. Gold's 
Gvm, 2003 UT 37, 1 13, 78 P.3d 600. 
113 Of course, the goal of communicating the scope of a 
servitude is most easily achieved by fixing the location of the 
easement in descriptive language within a deed. Although 
certainly desirable in most instances, language fixing the 
location of an easement is not always necessary when other terms 
of the easement safeguard the servient estate from the risk that 
its burden may be greater than that for which it bargained. 
114 The facts of this case illustrate this point. The 
minimum extent of the servitude can be easily extracted from the 
text of the deed. The area of the servient estate, the strip, is 
precisely described, as is the width of the easement, fifty-six 
feet. At minimum, the length of the easement would be equal to 
the width of the strip at a point bounded by Pine Street on one 
side and the Evanses' property on the other. The minimum gross 
area of the strip subject to the servitude can be easily 
calculated by multiplying the length by the width. The dominant 
estate, the Evanses' corner property, is identified. The stated 
purpose of the easement, a road connecting Pine Street to the 
corner property, is clear. Whatever uncertainty the County may 
have about the ultimate location of the Evanses' easement, the 
deed unambiguously communicated a full complement of data 
describing its minimum burden to the County's fee interest. 
Although the location of the easement was not fixed, the deed 
language removed from all doubt that the grantor and grantee 
intended to create an easement for a particular purpose, covering 
an ascertainable minimum area. 
115 This is not to diminish the importance of the location 
of the Evanses' easement on the strip. The three word phrase, 
"location, location, location," has earned its claim to hackneyed 
banality on the strength of the truth that it imparts about real 
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property. There can be little question that where the Evanses' 
easement finally alights will materially affect its burden on the 
County's land. Were the legal analysis to end here, we would 
agree with the County that a locating description for the 
easement was an essential term and that without it the easement 
would be unenforceable. But the analysis need not, and should 
not, end here. 
116 There is no dispute that the County was fully aware 
that the strip was burdened by an easement. Based on the 
language of the deed it could determine with precision what its 
minimum burden was. This sizeable quantity of evidence firmly 
establishes an intent to create an easement and unambiguously 
defines all essential features of the servitude except its 
location. Confronted with this evidence, we have an obligation 
to explore whether the deed's failure to identify the location of 
the easement can be remedied without altering in any material way 
the bargain struck between the grantor and grantee. Corbin on 
Contracts encourages this effort, stating: 
If the parties have concluded a transaction 
in which it appears that they intend to make 
a contract, the court should not frustrate 
their intention if it is possible to reach a 
fair and just result, even though this 
requires a choice among conflicting meanings 
and the filling of some gaps that the parties 
have left. 
Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993). 
117 The role of the court as contract "gap filler" is 
neither new nor revolutionary. See, e.g., Homestead Golf Club, 
Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000); Honolulu 
Waterfront Ltd. P'ship v. Aloha Tower Dev. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 
1230 (D. Haw. 1988); Berain v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 2000 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 2088 (D.N.Y. 2000); Zvonik v. Zvonik, 435 A.2d 
1236 (Pa. 1981); Alaimo v. Tsunoda, 215 Cal. App. 2d 94 (Ct. App. 
1963); Sterling v. Taylor, 113 Cal. App. 4th 931 (Ct. App. 2003); 
In re Sing Chona Co., 617 P.2d 578 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980); Wolvos 
v. Mever, 668 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 1996); Nusbaum v. Saffell, 313 
A.2d 837 (Md. 1974); Qglebav Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 
N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990); Genest v. John Glenn Corp., 696 P.2d 1058 
(Or. 1985). 
118 The location-fixing gap in the Evanses' deed is one 
that we are well suited to fill. We conclude that the most 
appropriate method to fix the site of the easement is to assign 
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to the County the authority to select its location. In 
exercising this authority, the County enjoys considerable 
discretion, limited by a duty to conform the positioning of the 
easement to the stated purposes of the easement reservation. See 
Barton v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996) (holding it is 
appropriate to fill in a missing term because we are not altering 
the agreement). 
fl9 We draw our confidence in selecting this approach from 
several sources. First, the designation of the County to locate 
the easement offers assurance that our "gap-filling" does not 
alter the scope of the servitude for which the County bargained. 
The County may, if it chooses, position the easement over that 
portion of the strip that conforms to the minimum amount of 
surface area contemplated in the deed description. If the 
alterations made by the County to the strip make this site 
impractical, the County is at liberty to select an alternate 
location fifty-six feet in width that provides the Evanses access 
from the corner property to Pine Street. Thus the opportunity to 
position the easement removes the issue of whether location 
selection is an essential term from the field of battle with 
neither side sustaining injury. 
120 This approach to locating unfixed easements has enjoyed 
general acceptance among courts and commentators. In adopting 
this approach we join a majority of jurisdictions that have 
confronted this issue. The following jurisdictions that have 
faced the question of how to deal with the unfixed easement 
location problem and have adopted some version of the model in 
which the owner of the servient estate is granted the first 
opportunity to define the easement location. Arkansas Val. Elec. 
CO-OP Corp. v. Brinks, 400 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Ark. 1966); Ballard 
v. Titus, 110 P. 118, 122 (Cal. 1910); Bethel v. Van Stone, 817 
P.2d 188, 193-94 (Idaho App. 1991); Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 
S.W.2d 691, 692-93 (Ky. 1960); Larson v. Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 
413, 417 (Minn. App. 1987); Graves v. Gerber, 302 N.W.2d 717, 720 
(Neb. 1981); Sussex Rural Elec. Co-op v. Wantage Tp., 526 A.2d 
259, 263-64 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987); Pomygalski v. Eagle 
Lake Farms, Inc., 596 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); 
McConnell v. Golden, 247 A.2d 909, 912 (R.I. 1968); Smith v. 
Comm'rs of Pub. Works, 441 S.E.2d 331, 337 (S.C. App. 1994); 
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. 2002); Patch v. 
Baird, 435 A.2d 690, 691-92 (Vt. 1981); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow 
Canvon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 588 (Wyo. 1999). 
521 Leading commentators have also endorsed the assignment 
of locating authority to the holder of the servient estate over 
voiding the easement. In their treatise, The Law of Easements & 
No. 20040739 6 
Licenses in Land, Professors Bruce and Ely summarize with 
approval that doing so is considered by "many jurisdictions" a 
practical approach to the problem. In these 
states, the owner of the servient estate is 
entitled to designate a reasonable location 
for the easement. If the servient owner 
fails to make such a designation within a 
reasonable period, the easement holder may 
select a reasonable route. If the parties 
are unable to reach an agreement, a court may 
specify a location for the easement. 
Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land 1 7.02 [2][a] (rev. ed. 2000). 
122 This pragmatic approach to easement location overcomes 
the County's objection that the Evanses' easement must fail 
because it cannot be "construed as to burden the servient estate 
only to the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose described in 
the grant." Weaaeland v. Uiifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963). 
Under our approach, the County is empowered to provide this 
assurance. In fact, all of the County's assertions that the term 
locating the easement is essential are variations on the theme 
that express descriptive language is required for the County to 
get what it bargained for. This complaint is unavailable to the 
County under the approach we announce today. Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
f23 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring's 
opinion. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF CONTINUANCE AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 050500546 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
This matter came before the above-entitled court pursuant to Plaintiff PacifiCorp's 
("PacifiCorp") Motion for Preliminary Injunction on April 27,2006 at 10:00 a.m. PacifiCorp 
was represented by Anthony L. Rampton. Defendants Eaglebrook Corporation and R.C. Tolman 
(collectively "Eaglebrook") were represented by Eric S. Rodriguez and Anthony P. Werrett. The 
742I2WI 
Court, having not had sufficient time in which to complete the hearing of this matter, and the 
parties having stipulated to the extension of a preliminary injunction until this matter can be 
completed, now enters the following Order: 
(1) The hearing on PacifiCorp's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is continued to a 
date uncertain, which will be reset as soon as the Court's schedule can accommodate. 
(2) The following Preliminary Injunction is hereby entered, pursuant to stipulation, to 
be effective to and until this matter can be heard and a determination by the Court can be made: 
(A) That Eaglebrook is restrained and enjoined from interfering with 
PacifiCorp's access via the existing paved extension of Winchester Drive to its Winchester Hills 
Substation. 
(B) This Preliminary Injunction is conditioned upon PacifiCorp giving notice 
by telephone to Mr. R.C. Tolman when its trucks intend to access the substation for purposes of 
routine maintenance and inspection. 
(C) In accessing the substation along the aforementioned extension of 
Winchester Drive, PacifiCorp's trucks and vehicles will not exceed 10 miles per hour. 
(D) The notice requirement will not apply in situations involving a power 
outage or other emergency. 
V&>3,: DATED this »» day of' ^ \, 2006. 
BY THE C0URT 
Eric A. Ludlow 
74212W1 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Anthony L/Jfcampton 
EricKodnguez 
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D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION TO SETTING ASIDE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 050500546 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Plaintiff PacifiCorp, dba Utah Power, hereby stipulates to the setting aside of the Preliminary 
Injunction entered on April 25,2005. This stipulation is based upon the fact that, unbeknownst to counsel, 
the Complaint had not been served upon the defendants prior to the hearing on PlaintifFs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, Plaintiff PacifiCorp hereby requests that a hearing date be set for 
purposes of Plaintiff PacifiCorp's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
734275vl 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2006. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Anthony/vpcampton 
Attomej#or Plaintiff PacifiCorp 
734275v! 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on March 
6, 2006, to the following person at the address listed below: 
Eric S. Rodriguez, Esq. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, UT 84770 
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170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
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D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
Telephone: (435)628-1627 
Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIF1CORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
STIPULATION TO 
Plaintiff, CONTINUANCE 
v. : 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah : Case No. 050500546 
corporation, and R. C. TOLMAN, an : 
individual, : Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendants. : 
The parties, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate to the 
continuance of the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction to July 26,2006 at 
9:00 a.m. 
tS K 
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DATED this Jt£_ day of June, 2006. 
Anthony L. R^fripton 
Jones Wa#K> Holbrook & McDonough 
iric Rodriguez 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, on June 19,2006, to the following person at the address listed below: 
Anthony L. Rampton, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D. Williams Ronnow, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C. 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A 
St. George, Utah 84770-3041 
ia Stephens " 
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WASHINGTON COUNTY 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. (#8343) 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)986-8200 
Facsimile: (435)673-8999 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050500546 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION HEARING 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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The parties, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate to the 
continuance of the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction to September 25, 
2006, at 9:30 a.m. 
Dated this / # _ day of July, 2006 
ANTHON^rL. RAMPTON, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dated this 14th day of July 2006 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, on y*£u / % , 2006, to the following person at the address listed below: 
Eric S. Rodriguez, Esq. 
249 E. Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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December 5,2006 
The Honorable Eric Ludlow 
Judge of the Fifth District Court 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
RE: Pacificorp v. Eaglebrook Corporation, et al. 
Case No. 050550546 
o-. 
J>?tZ& . < # 
Dear Judge Ludlow: 
Enclosed please find the original and three copies of the Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. If it meets with your approval, please date and sign the original Order and 
return the filed-endorsed copies to me in the envelope provided. 
If the Order does not meet with your approval, please contact me or Robert Graham at our St. 
George office to discuss the changes you would like to make. 
I have enclosed a copy of the firm's billing statements for your review. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
ROB GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES 
CUA. KL (fezuJrviB. 
>usan K. Barone 
Legal Assistant 
Enclosures 
cc Anthony Rampton, Esq. (Order) 
R.C. Tolman (Order and billing statements) 
ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. 
LAW OFFICES OF ERIC S. RODRIGUEZ 
Utah State Bar No. 8343 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)986-8200 
Facsimile: (435)673-8999 
ROBERT C. GRAHAM, ESQ. 
ROB GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES 
Nevada State Bar No. 4618 
7375 W. Peak Drive, Suite 220 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 
Telephone: (702)255-6161 
Facsimile: (702) 255-8383 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, s 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an i 
Defendants. 
an Oregon 
aUtah 
individual, 
Case No. 050500546 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Judge Eric Ludlow 
/ / / 
1 
This matter having come on for hearing on November 16,2006; ANTHONY 
RAMPTON, ESQ. of the Law Firm of JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, 
having submitted an opposition on behalf of Plaintiff PACMCORP, but not appearing; and 
ERIC RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. and ROBERT C. GRAHAM, ESQ., appearing on behalf of 
Defendants, EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION and R.C. TOLMAN; Mr. TOLMAN also being 
present; this Court having reviewed the Motion to Dismiss submitted by the Defendants; and this 
Court having found good cause finds and rules as follows: 
1. THIS COURT FINDS that proper notice has been given of the time and date of the 
hearing for Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court is informed that MR. RAMPTON is 
unable to attend the Court hearing due to illness; however, no other attorney from JONES 
WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH is present and appearing for the Plaintiff at the 
appointed time and place. The Court is not in receipt of a Motion to Continue from the Plaintiff 
or a Stipulation to Continue between the parties to move this matter to another date and time. As 
such, in making this Order, this Court considers all the pleadings on file as well as the oral 
arguments of the counsel for the Defendants who are before the Court at this time. 
2. THIS COURT FINDS that the Plaintiff has failed to serve the Defendants, or to 
present any evidence of such service made within one hundred twenty (120) days of filing the 
Complaint as required under URCP 4(bXi). The Court finds that the language of URCP 4(b)(i) is 
mandatory and requires dismissal of any actions that are not timely served. Such a dismissal is 
without prejudice to the Plaintiff. The Court notes that the dismissal may be made by way of 
motion by a party. The Court also notes that it has the power to dismiss the matter without 
prejudice on its own initiative. 
2 
3. THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants did not receive any notice of this action 
from the Plaintiffs until well after one hundred twenty (120) days from the filing of the 
Complaint. 
4. THIS COURT FINDS that there is no dispute that the first notice of this action by the 
Defendants came by way of the service the Order for Preliminary Injunction that had been 
obtained by the Plaintiffs without the Defendants knowledge or participation. The Court notes 
that the Order for Preliminary Injunction was later voluntarily vacated by the Plaintiff because 
the Defendants did not have notice of the hearing or action. 
5. THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants have preserved their right to assert the 
dismissal of this action under URCP 4(b)(i) in their pleadings and oral arguments before this 
Court during previous appearances. 
6. THIS COURT FINDS there is nothing in the record reflecting that any extensions 
have been sought or granted by the Court extending the one hundred twenty (120) day time 
allotted for service of the Complaint. 
7. THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants have necessarily defended this action in 
good faith, despite theLprocedural errors of the Plaintiff. To that end, the Court4inds4hat4he— 
Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. More specifically, the 
Court finds that the Defendants acted in good faith in moving this Court to set aside the Order for 
Preliminary Injunction where no notice of the action had been given to the Defendants regarding 
the hearing; the Court finds that the Defendants acted in good faith in attempting to ascertain the 
nature of the case despite never having been served with a copy of the Complaint or the pending 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction; the Court finds that the Defendants acted in good faith in 
3 
defending the subject matter of the suit in preliminary hearings and settlement conferences while 
concurrently preserving their procedural rights; and the Court finds that the Defendants acted in 
good faith in bringing this Motion to Dismiss based upon lack of timely service by the Plaintiff. 
8. THIS COURT FINDS that upon reviewing the attorney fees and costs of Defendants, 
that under the circumstances, an award of attorney fees in the amount of Seventeen Thousand 
Three Hundred Fifty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($17,358.00) and costs of suit in the amount of 
Four Hundred Twenty-Seven and 97/100 Dollars ($427.97) is reasonable. 
WHEREFORE THIS COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS based upon the findings above: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint in this instant action is dismissed without prejudice 
for Plaintiffs failure to prove service or effectuate service within one hundred twenty (120) days 
of the date of filing of the Complaint; 
IT IS ORDERED that an award of reasonable attorney fees in the amount of Seventeen 
Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($17,358.00) and costs of suit in the 
amount of Four Hundred Twenty-Seven and 97/100 Dollars ($427.97) be made as against the 
Plaintiff to the benefit of the Defendants, to be paid within thirty (30) days from the notice of 
entry of this Order. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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IT IS ORDERED that any and all orders of injunctive relief related to this case, whether 
by stipulation or by direct order of this Court, and any other temporary orders of this Court on 
this matter predating this order are hereby forever vacated and released; and 
IT IS ORDERED that all further hearing dates on this matter are vacated. No trial date 
has been set on this matter. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Submitted and prepared by: 
ROB GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES 
GRAHAM, ESQ. 
Ndvada State Bar No. 4618 
7375 W. Peak Drive, Suite 220 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 
(702)255-6161 
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Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2681) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Pacificorp, dba Utah Power 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
POWER, an Oregon corporation, 
: RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
: Case No. 050500546 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah : 
corporation and R.C. Tolman, an individual, : Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff Pacificorp, dba Rocky Mountain Power ("Rocky Mountain") submits the following in 
opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Long after Defendants have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, Defendants 
seek Summary Judgment on the basis of Rocky Mountain's failure to serve Defendants with a summons. 
For the reasons set forth herein, it is fundamental law that Defendants, by their participation in this 
matter regarding the merits of the case, have waived any right they may have had to challenge the 
jurisdiction of this Court. The Motion must be denied. 
761872_I.DOC 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. At the hearing thai took place on April 27, 2006. Defendants did not raise the issue of the 
summons or the issue of the Court's jurisdictions over their persons. Rather, Defendants argued and 
examined a witness on the underlying merits of Rocky Mountain's claim. 
2. During the course of this hearing, Defendants stipulated to a continuance of the hearing 
and leaving the Preliminary Injunction in place. 
3. On May 11, 2006, the Court entered an Order of Continuance and Preliminary Injunction 
(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") continuing the aforementioned hearing as well as ihe 
application of the Preliminary Injunction. This Order was agreed as to form by Defendants' counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
The purpose of the service of Summons is to give the Court jurisdiction over the person of the 
Defendant. See, Henry D. McDonald v. F. A. Mabce. 243 U.S. 90 (S. Ct. 1917); Swetnam v. Dalbv. 79 
P.2d 20 (Utah 1938). Slated differently, the Courts of this state have ruled that the service of a summons 
implements the procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed of pending legal action 
and be provided with the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the action. Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269 (Utah 1987). However, it has long been held that this procedural due process requirement is 
satisfied, with or without service of summons, if the defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the 
court by addressing matters going to the merits of the case as opposed to simply challenging the 
jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Swetnam v. Dalbv, 79 P.2d 20 (Utah 1938); Barber v, Caldcn 522 
P.2d 700 (Utah 1974); Prandsen v. Holladav. 739 P.2d 1111 (Utah App. 1987). This distinction has 
historically been characterized as a "general/' as opposed to "special" appearance. While Rule 12(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a defendant to raise insufficiency of process along with other 
defenses going to the merits of the Complaint, a Defendant is under a duty to raise failure of service 
before actively participating in the defense on the merits or otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction of 
the court. See, e,g., L B. Colt Co. v. District Court 72 Utah 281, 269 P. 1017 (1928); Cooke v, Cooke. 
67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926); Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). Should the Defendant do 
anything that recognizes the court's jurisdiction over his person, he has waived any right to challenge 
the sufficiency of service. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926;, Frandsen v. Holladav. 739 
P . 2 d l l l l (UtahApp. 1987). 
Rocky Mountain does not dispute the fact that, at the time that this action was initially filed, 
Defendants were not properly served with process. Rocky Mountain has stipulated to this fact on the 
record. However, Defendants' actions since have waived the requirement of service of summons by 
actively participating in tills case and clearly submitting to the jurisdiction or this Court. First, on 
April 27,2006, Defendants participated in an evidentiary hearing going to the merits of Rocky 
Mountain's claim. Defendants7 counsel made arguments going to the merits and cross-examined a 
witness whose testimony goes to the merits of Rocky Mountain's claim. More significantly, however, is 
the fact that at the time the hearing was continued, Defendants agreed to be bound by the stipulated, 
preliminary injunction. This stipulation on the record was later formally entered through the Order of 
Continuance and Preliminary Injunction. By stipulating to the Court's jurisdiction over the persons of 
the Defendants for purposes of the effectuation of the continuing preliminary injunction, Defendants 
cannot be heard to contest that same jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The requirements of procedural due process have been met in this matter. Defendants have 
received notice of the action and have had a full opponunity to be heard. Defendants have stipulated to 
the jurisdiction of this Court over their persons by agreeing to abide by the provisions of the continuing 
preliminary injunction. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
Dated this 28th day of September, 2006. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Anthony L. x^rfipt 
Attorneys fpf Plaintiffs 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of September, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Eric S. Rodgriguez, Esq. 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Robert C. Graham, Esq. 
7375 W. Peak Dr., Suite 220 
Las Vegas, NV 89128 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION. 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 050500546 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERIC A. LUDLOW 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
OBJECTION HEARING 
FEBRUARY 12, 2007 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan 
ORIGINAL 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
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ANTHONY L. RAMPTON 
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February 12, 2007. St. George, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: This is 050500546. Record should reflect 
that Mr. Tony Rampton appearing on behalf of Pacificorp, and 
Mr. Rob Graham appearing on behalf of Eaglebrook Corporation. 
Mr. Rampton. 
MR. RAMPTON: Yes, Your Honor. We have been in 
chambers. And the court has indicated that, your reluctance 
to change the decision that was made at the prior hearing. 
But I would request that you hear arguments so that I can 
make a record. 
THE COURT: Certainly, counsel. Go ahead. 
MR. RAMPTON: As I indicated to the court in 
chambers, I was not at the last hearing because I was under 
the impression that the hearing had been continued. I'm not 
going to go into who was right and who was wrong. I'm just 
going to say that I believe that the matter had been 
continued and that was the reason I was not here. 
The only reason that's significant is that I believe, 
without hearing the other side, the court has made a ruling 
that is contrary to law and constitutes error. Having said 
that, Your Honor, this issue, this question before the court 
that was before the court at the last hearing, turns on the 
issue of personal jurisdiction of this court over the 
defendants. Generally, jurisdiction is obtained by the 
II filing of a complaint and the service of a summons. And Rule 
2 I 4(b) requires that that service of the summons be 
3 1 accomplished within 120 days. The court is given the 
4 1 authority to extend that deadline if it chooses. But, 
5 I apparently, the court is not prepared to do that. In any 
6 1 event, just generally, the purpose of the service of a 
7 1 summons is twofold. The first is a due process issue. And 
8I that is that the service of a summons gives the defendant 
9 I notice that there is a proceeding and gives the defendant an 
10 J opportunity to be heard. The second purpose, as I have 
11I indicated, is that it is through the summons that the court 
12 I obtains jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant. 
13I Now, the service of summons requirement can be 
14 1 waived. And it can be waived in a number of ways. Five of 
151 those ways apply in this case, any one of which should defeat 
16 1 the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
17 I The service of summons can be waived by failure to 
18 I assert the defense of improper service in either the answer 
19 1 or by motion. And that's Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
20 1 Civil Procedure. Also, the Utah Supreme Court case of 
21 Watkiss & Campbell vs. F.O.A., 808 P.2d 1061. 
22I A second way of waiver is by litigating the merits of 
23 I the case prior to making a motion to dismiss challenging the 
24 1 jurisdiction of the court. That's Curtis vs. Curtis. Again, 
251 that's a Utah case, 789 P.2d 707. 
1 I The third way that you can waive the summons 
2 I requirement is by making an argument that is inconsistent 
3 1 with the challenge to the court's jurisdiction. And I cite 
4 1 the court to Barlow vs. Cappo, C-a-p-p-o, again, a Utah case, 
5 821 P.2d 465, case decided in 1991. 
6 I The fourth way that waiver can occur is by asking the 
7 1 court to give some kind of affirmative relief. In other 
8 1 words, you can't go to the court and say on the one hand, I 
9 1 want you to give me relief and, on the other hand, you don't 
10 I really have jurisdiction over me. So, if the defendant asks 
11 I for any form of affirmative relief, the defendant waives the 
12 I service of process. And that's Downy State Bank vs. Major 
13 1 Blakeny Corporation, 545 P.2d 507. 
14 I The fifth way that service can be waived, and that 
15 I applies in this case, is by consenting to or stipulating to 
16 1 the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. And there 
17 1 are two cases, both Utah cases, Bernard vs. Wasserman, 855 
18 1 P.2d 243, and Hatch vs. Sykes, which was decided in 2005, is 
19 1 a court of appeals case. It's an unreported decision, but it 
20 J appears at 2005 Utah AP 280. 
21 I Those five ways of waiving the service of process 
22 I requirement all apply in this case, any one of which should 
23 1 defeat the motion to dismiss. 
24 I Let's look at the course of proceedings and see how 
25 1 the whole thing plays through. The complaint was filed in 
1 April of 2005, April 1 of 2005. It's a complaint for a 
2 I declaratory determination of the rights to the easement in 
3 J question and for injunctive relief restraining the defendants 
4 I from interfering with access to the substation along that 
5 1 easement. At the time that the, or shortly, a couple of days 
6 I after the complaint was filed, an ex parte temporary 
7 I restraining order was obtained. That was obtained on 
8 1 April 4th, 2005. That temporary restraining order was, 
9 1 however, not served until August 9th of 2005. There was no 
10 I service of the complaint upon either one of the defendants 
111 during the 120 day period. No question. We weren't even 
12 I aware that the defendants had not been served until after the 
13 1 expiration of the 120 days. 
14 I A preliminary injunction was issued by this court on 
15 I April 14, 2005. At the hearing, defendants were not present 
16 1 and were not represented. Obviously, the reasons they 
17 1 weren't is that they had not been served with the complaint 
18 1 or the temporary restraining order. 
19 1 Then the defendants, through counsel, Mr. Rodriguez, 
20 1 filed a petition to set aside the preliminary injunction. 
211 And that motion was made on February 24thf 2006. That's 
22 1 approximately six months after Mr. Tolman was served with the 
23 1 temporary restraining order. In any event, in that motion, 
24 1 counsel raised the lack of service of process. But he did 
25 I so, not from the prospective of lack of jurisdiction but, 
1 I rather, from the perspective of no notice and no opportunity 
2 1 to be heard. The motion itself, Your Honor, asks the court 
3 1 to set aside the preliminary injunction. The operative 
4 1 language of the motion is as follows: "Petitioner asks this 
5 1 court to set aside the preliminary injunction and to grant R. 
6 1 C. Tolman and Eaglebrook Corporation permission to file an 
7 1 opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction." 
8 1 It was not a motion to dismiss. It was not a motion 
9 1 contesting this court's jurisdiction. It was a motion to set 
10 1 aside the preliminary injunction and allow them an 
111 opportunity to argue on the merits. Most of the brief that 
12 I was submitted, Your Honor, in support of that motion, went to 
13 1 the merits of the case; that is, whether this easement 
14 I exists. 
15 I The motion also asks Your Honor for an award of 
16 1 attorneys fees in the amount of $1,000. In other words, Mr. 
17 1 Tolman asked this court to give him affirmative relief. 
18 I Rule 12 requires that the defense of service must be 
19 1 raised in either the answer or the motion. When it talks 
20 1 about a motion, Your Honor, it's talking about a motion to 
211 dismiss. It's not talking about a motion to simply allow the 
22 1 defendants to answer on the merits. It's not. And I cite 
23 1 the court to the Utah case of Dennet, D-E-N-N-E-T-T, vs. 
24 Powers. That's 536 P.2d 135. 
25 I The next thing that happened after the filing of the 
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We did not stipulate to the dismissal of this action. 
The next thing that occurred was that we had a 
hearing motion for preliminary injunction. And that took 
place in this court, actually, was the courtroom right next 
to us here, I believe. And that hearing took place on 
April 27th, 2006. Just before the hearing, we received what 
was called a notice of supreme court precedent. And that was 
attaching the Utah Supreme Court case of Evans vs. The Board. 
That case, Your Honor, has nothing to do with jurisdiction, 
has nothing to do with a motion to dismiss, goes only to the 
question of the easement, goes only to the merits of this 
case. 
Now, at the hearing on the 27th of April, this past 
lj year, I've looked at the tape. And counsel, Mr. Rodriguez, 
2I did not make a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon 
3I lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. He 
4 1 was required to do so. He did, in his opening remarks, 
5 1 indicate that there was no service. But that wasn't attached 
6 1 to anything else. He didn't do anything with it. The case 
7 1 then went ahead on the merits. No motion to dismiss, 
8 1 examination of great being. That examination took 
9 1 approximately an hour, an hour and-a-half. Then the court 
10 1 took a recess. And, after the recess, the court indicated 
111 that it had scheduling problems, was not going to be able to 
12 I conclude the hearing, and asked counsel to come back into 
13 1 chambers. I went back into chambers. Mr. Rodriguez went 
14 1 back into chambers. And while we were in chambers, it was 
15I stipulated that until the court could hear, could finish 
16 1 hearing the motion for preliminary injunction, that an 
17 1 injunction would be in place, that is, that the court would 
18 1 enter a preliminary injunction that would be binding upon the 
19 1 defendants that would allow access to the substation during 
20 1 the pendency of the case with certain conditions: On a 
211 general maintenance call, Pacificorp would have to call Mr. 
22 1 Tolman and alert him. If they went into the substation, they 
23I couldn't exceed 10 miles per hour. Those requirements, that 
24 1 is, the notice requirement wouldn't apply if there was an 
25 1 emergency situation. In any event, that's what was agreed 
ll to. When we came back into court, and on the record it was 
2 1 stipulated first by me and then by Mr. Rodriguez, that the 
3 I preliminary injunction, as outlined, would be imposed by this 
4| court on the defendants. 
5 I Then, Your Honor, there were a couple of stipulations 
6 J for continuance of the hearing on preliminary injunction. 
7 I The first one was entered on June 22nd. And that was 
8 I extending the date to July 26th, 2006. Once again, counsel 
9 I for defendants stipulated to the continuance and stipulated 
10 1 to the fact that the preliminary injunction would continue to 
111 apply. A second stipulation for continuance was entered on 
12 I July 20th, 2006. And that was extending the date for the 
13 1 hearing on preliminary injunction to September 25th, 2006. 
14I Again, counsel stipulated to the continuance and, therefore, 
151 stipulated to the continuing effect of the preliminary 
161 injunction. 
17 1 Then, it wasn't until August 29, of 2006, over 1 
18 1 year, approximately 13 months after Mr. Tolman was served 
19 1 with a temporary restraining order, only then did the 
20 1 defendants for the first time ask this court to dismiss the 
211 complaint for failure to serve Mr. Tolman. As I indicated, 
22I the defendants have waived the service requirement in five 
23I different ways, any one of which would constitute a waiver 
24 1 and, therefore, make the court's ruling in error. 
25 1 First one is they failed to make the appropriate 
1 I motion when they filed the petition to set aside the 
2 1 preliminary injunction. They were required, at that point, 
3I if they were going to raise this question by motion rather 
4 1 than by answer. The motion that they were required to file 
5I was a motion to dismiss claiming the court did not have 
6I jurisdiction over the defendants. They did not. They asked 
7I the court to strike or set aside the preliminary injunction 
8I to allow them to come in and address the merits. That 
9 1 constituted a waiver. They had, at the same time, asked this 
10I court to award attorney's fees. In other words, they asked 
111 this court to grant affirmative relief. That constitutes a 
12 J waiver. 
13 1 Last, or thirdly, they made arguments inconsistent 
14 1 with a motion to dismiss which they were required to bring. 
15 1 If they were going to again raise this question by motion 
16 1 rather than by answer, the motion is a motion to dismiss. 
17 1 They did not. They came in and contested the merits of the 
18 1 preliminary injunction. That constituted a waiver. 
19 1 Litigating the merits without testing the court's 
20 J jurisdiction constituted a fourth waiver. All of the papers 
21I that were filed from the moment that they filed the initial 
22 1 petition, all of those papers went to the merits of the case. 
23 1 The hearing went to the merits of the case. There was not 
24I any effort at the hearing on preliminary injunction to 
25 1 contest the court's jurisdiction. There was no effort to 
1 I raise the question of jurisdiction over the persons of the 
2 I defendant. They participated on the merits. That's a 
3 I waiver. 
4 1 Lastly, Your Honor, by stipulating to the court's 
5 I jurisdiction, which they did by agreeing to the imposition 
6 1 and the binding effect of the preliminary injunction, that 
7 1 constitutes a waiver in and of itself. You can't on the one 
8 1 hand stipulate to the court's jurisdiction so far as the 
9 I effect of the preliminary injunction and, on the other hand, 
10 1 argue that the court doesn't have any jurisdiction. You can 
111 not do it. That same waiver happened two more times. 
12 I Because each time counsel stipulated to the continuance of 
13 1 the preliminary injunction hearing, he also stipulated to the 
14 1 extension of the preliminary injunction. On three occasions, 
15 I counsel for defendant stipulated that they were bound by an 
16 1 order of this court. You can't agree to be bound by the 
17 1 order of the court if the court has no jurisdiction. 
18I I submit, Your Honor, that for all of these reasons 
19 1 the notice — pardon me, the service of summons requirement 
20I in Rule 4(b) has been waived. We went down the road of the 
211 merits of this lawsuit for 13 months. During that 13 month 
22 1 period, legal arguments were made on the merits. Witnesses 
23I were examined on the merits. Stipulations as to preliminary 
24 I injunctions occurred. There is no basis at this point for 
25 1 the dismissal of this action if it's dismissal on the basis 
II of failure to serve process. 
2 I Lastly, Your Honor, the question of attorney's fees. 
3 I When I got this motion --
4 1 THE COURT: Mr. Rampton, frankly, with respect to the 
5 1 issue of attorney's fees, if you would have appeared on 
6 1 November 16th, 2005, or someone from your firm would have 
7I appeared, I doubt very much, in fact, I believe the court 
8 1 would have not granted attorney's fees. So, with respect to 
9 J that issue, I think that's a moot issue, because the court's 
10 1 going to set aside the court order with respect to attorney's 
111 fees at this time. I just don't think I would have awarded 
12 1 those at the time. So, I don't think you need to argue that, 
13 I counsel. 
14 J MR. RAMPTON: I submit it then, Your Honor. 
15 1 THE COURT: Mr. Graham. 
16 1 MR. GRAHAM: Your Honor, Mr. Rampton has done a very 
17 1 good job of arguing personal jurisdiction. The problem is, 
18 1 it's not what we are here today to argue. We are here to 
19 1 argue a failure, a wholesale failure to bring this matter 
20 1 before this court under procedures, rules of the Utah Rules 
211 of Civil Procedure. Personal jurisdiction is not the issue. 
22 I Complying with the rules and properly framing this case and 
23 I allowing the defendants to proceed under the rules as opposed 
24 1 to Mr. Rampton's rules is what is at issue. 
25 1 It's interesting to note that there is an admission 
1I on the record, more than one, that the service was not done 
2 1 within 120 days. In addition, there was no request for an 
3 1 extension. And no good cause shown why an extension should 
4I be granted. The case law under procedure, not for personal 
5 1 jurisdiction, is that you have 120 days unless the court 
6 1 grants an extension. I think it's well established that that 
7 1 request for extension must also be within 120 days. Thus, we 
8I see over 600 days later, where do the defendants stand? The 
9I defendants do not have a service of the summons or the 
10 1 complaint. The defendants do not have a motion for 
111 preliminary injunction. Never served upon us. Because, in 
12I Mr. Rampton's world, that's not necessary. He makes the 
13I rules. 
14I When we look at what has been provided, the answer is 
15 1 very simple. Nothing. Why the delays? The delays were 
16I caused by a perpetual request by the defendants to prove 
17 1 service. Now, understand, as this court does, you can serve 
18 1 by many different ways, in many different fashions. You can 
19 1 go to the residence and say, we have an adult here. I'm 
201 going to leave the service here. And you then go to the 
21I process server and say, I want an affidavit that states I 
22 1 left it at that residence. We are also dealing with a 
23 1 corporation here; whereby, that corporation could have been 
24I served by the Secretary of State or the division that handles 
25 1 that. There is multiple ways of service. 
1I And when a party is involved in initial appearances, 
2 I the first question that is asked is, can you prove service? 
3 I Because we don't see service upon our client. Mr. Tolman 
4 1 saying, I haven't gotten anything. All I got was an order. 
5 1 At the time Mr. Tolman received the order, we were already 
6 1 well after the 120 days. In addition, no extension had been 
7 1 granted by this court to extend the service. However, Your 
8 1 Honor, as you will read in our pleadings, there is a case, I 
9 1 believe that is out of Kentucky, federal case, that certainly 
10 1 is an interesting case. Because what it says as long as a 
111 party preserves the issue, they can go ahead and unwind what 
12 1 an aggressive defendant or plaintiff has done. 
13 1 In this case, we had an aggressive plaintiff, so 
14I aggressive, in fact, that they had an order for a preliminary 
15 1 injunction without even giving Mr. Tolman or his company any 
16 1 notice. So, we have a situation where something that the 
17I plaintiff had done had prejudiced the defendants. And they 
18 1 had to take action to unwind what had been done. And that's 
19 1 why that case is very interesting. The case says, basically, 
20I you can preserve that right. You can say we have not been 
211 served and then unwind what has been done. Why? Because at 
22I the time it was raised, there was an order of this court that 
23 1 could have been and was, in fact, enforced. I give an 
24 1 example. Mr. Tolman said, hey, I don't want you coming 
25 1 across this property. And they said, we've got an order. 
II Guess what? Mr. Tolman had to back down. So, under those 
2 I circumstances, even though he had never been given a summons, 
3 1 never been given a complaint, never been given a motion for 
4 I preliminary injunction, he was subject to that order. So, 
5 1 what does he do? He gets attorneys. And he says, attorneys 
6 1 can you at least give me relief? The attorneys then file a 
7 1 motion to set aside that preliminary injunction order. Why? 
8 I Because it had been improperly brought. Why? Because Mr. 
9I Tolman had not received service of the complaint, service of 
10 I the summons or service of the motion for preliminary 
111 injunction. He had received nothing. That was raised in the 
12I motion for preliminary -- or motion to set aside that order, 
13 1 hence, preserving that right, not waiving that right. 
14I Now, we are not talking, judge, about personal 
15 1 jurisdiction as Mr. Rampton would argue. We are talking 
16 1 about compliance with rules of procedure. Given the fact 
17 1 that we have yet to receive any of these documents, given the 
18I fact that we have yet to receive any documents regarding the 
19 1 preliminary injunction or even a list of the witnesses, we 
20 1 are at substantial prejudice. And we have had to unwind 
211 these matters. 
22 I Now, on the record in the preliminary injunction 
23 1 hearing, it was not clear what was going to happen that day. 
24 1 I think everybody could admit that. We weren't certain 
25 1 exactly what was going to happen that day. The court had 
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accomplished, is I stipul ated that service wasn't 
accomplished,
 A stipulated that the preliminary injunction 
II be set aside. There is no attempt to delay. There was no 
2 1 attempt to take advantage. As soon as I found out, I said, I 
3 1 stipulate there was no service. 
4 1 MR. GRAHAM: Yet, Your Honor, if I might add, he had 
5 1 three witnesses appear at the first hearing as if he had --
6 MR. RAMPTON: We didn't know. 
7 J MR. GRAHAM: I'm just saying, Your Honor, we had the 
8 I ability to defend ourselves. 
91 MR. HAMPTON; Judge, no — 
10 1 THE COURT: Counsel, let's do this. Mr. Rampton, Mr. 
Ill Graham, you both cited case law. Would you like the court to 
12 I consider the cases that you have indicated to the court? 
13 1 I've a pretty good idea how I am going to rule. However, 
14 1 there are issue of attorney's fees and the, also the whole, 
151 well, the whole issue with respect to jurisdiction and 
16 1 whether or not proper form was followed in this case. But I 
17 1 want to give everyone an opportunity. Mr. Rampton, do you 
18 1 want to give those cases to the court? Do you want me to 
191 consider those? And, Mr. Graham? 
20 MR. RAMPTON: Yes. 
211 MR. GRAHAM: Your Honor, with all due respect, with 
22 I the exception of those that have been raised today, and in 
23 1 the preliminary matters that is part of the record, I 
24 1 certainly wouldn't mind if the court wants to take a look at 
25 1 those. We have cited our cases in response. And I'm 
II comfortable with that we'll convince the court of our 
2 I arguments. 
3 1 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. What would be a 
4 1 reasonable time, Mr. Rampton, Mr. Graham, of any case law you 
5 1 would like to provide to the court? And, also, I'm going to 
61 ask counsel to prepare a proposed order for the court. 
7 I However, in the interim, there needs to be some accommodation 
8 I with respect to the property. And Rocky Mountain Power, 
91 Pacificorp, their trucks need to be able to service their 
10 1 equipment. And I would suggest it seems like there has been 
111 an accommodation. But I understand that in the last two 
12 1 weeks, apparently, Pacificorp or Rocky Mountain Power was out 
13 1 to the site and, Mr. Graham, you've indicated there might 
14 1 have been some problems at that time, so it's not working as 
15 1 nicely as the court would like it to. 
16 MR. GRAHAM: Right. 
17 1 THE COURT: I think we need to address that issue, 
18 I counsel. Because if I rule today, then I see that Mr. 
19 1 Rampton will go ahead and file the new action and away we go. 
20 1 However, if the court takes the matter under advisement and 
211 allows Mr. Rampton and Mr. Graham to submit the case law, 
22 1 it's going to take some time for the court to peruse those 
23 1 cases and also to look at the orders. And so, in the 
24 I meantime, I still want to make sure that Rocky Mountain Power 
25 1 has got the opportunity to go and service that equipment so 
ll we don't have any problems up there in the meantime. 
2I MR. GRAHAM: In essence, Your Honor, what we have 
3 I discussed with Mr. Rampton, we have shown him on the map 
4 1 where the error had taken place. And the prior order of this 
5 1 court, I think, is still in effect. So, I don't think there 
6 1 is anything new that we have to do, nor would we ask for any 
7 1 new action. We have explained the detail, showed him a map 
8I and said, here's where the error is occurring. There is 
9 1 already another easement. They just have to switch over to 
10I the other easement. And I think Mr. Rampton can take that 
111 back to his clients. And we have the prior matter that's 
12 1 still binding. 
13 1 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rampton. 
14 1 MR. RAMPTON: I have the cases right here. I'll 
15 1 leave them with the court. 
16 1 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 
17 1 MR. .RAMPTON; Can I approach? 
18 I THE COURT: Yes. 
19 1 MR. RAMPTON; I would also like to get counsel's 
20 1 stipulation on the record that he has accepted service of 
211 process on behalf of the defendants in this action in the new 
22 I action. 
23 1 THE COURT: Counsel, I appreciate that. Mr. Graham? 
24 1 MR. GRAHAM; I'm sorry? I missed that. I was 
25 1 getting a drink of water. 
II THE COURT: Mr. Rampton is asking if he can have a 
2 I stipulation that you went ahead and accepted service in the 
3 1 new action in chambers. 
4 1 MR. GRAHAM; Yes. I have no problem. 
5 1 THE COURT: Any problems in the future? 
6 1 MR. GRAHAM: It was only the issue, Your Honor, that 
7 J it had not been filed yet, so I was waiting for him to amend 
8 1 the case number. 
9 MR. HAMPTON; It will be filed. I can start. 
10I MR. GRAHAM: That's right. I'm just asking him to 
111 give us the case number so we can follow. 
12I THE COURT: And he was unable to do so because, I 
13 1 believe, that was about 40 minutes in chambers. And Mr. 
14 1 Rampton hasn't had that opportunity to eve get over to 
15 I clerk's office as of yet. 
16 1 Okay. Counsel, let me ask, how much time for a 
17I proposed order that counsel can go ahead and prepare an order 
18I for the court, a proposed order? 
19 1 MR. RAMPTON: I can prepare an order, proposed order 
20 1 in a couple of days. 
211 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Graham? 
22 1 MR. GRAHAM: Yeah. Based upon what the court — 
23 1 THE COURT: Probably the sooner the better. I 
24 1 understand that counsel is very busy. And I don't want to go 
25 1 ahead and set an unreasonable deadline. 
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3 1 very much. Court will go ahead and stand in recess. 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACMCORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
an Oregon 
vs. 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation and R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No: 050500546 MI 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
This matter having come on for hearing on February 12,2007; ANTHONY RAMPTON, 
ESQ., of the Law Firm of JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, having submitted an 
opposition and objection on behalf of Plaintiff PACIFICORP, and appearing on behalf of Plaintiff; 
and ROBERT C. GRAHAM, ESQ., ERIC RODRIGUEZ, ESQ., and ADAM MCMILLEN, ESQ., 
1 
by the Plaintiff without the Defendants' knowledge or participation. This Order was served upon 
the Defendants after the period of service had expired. The Court notes that the Order for Preliminary 
Injunction was later voluntarily vacated by the Plaintiff because the Defendants did not have notice 
of the hearing or action. At that time, the Plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss the action, but 
proceeded to litigate the case as if service had been rendered within the 120 days, which it had not. 
5. THIS COURT FINDS that Defendants preserved their right to assert the dismissal 
of this action under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(bXi), in their initial pleadings 
submitted to this Court More particularly, the Defendants raised the issue of non-service of the 
Summons and Complaint in their initial pleading. The Defendants then concurrently protected their 
rights by asking the Court to set aside an improperly obtained Preliminary Injunction Order which 
at that time had the color of law and was obtained under improper circumstances. Had the 
Defendants not so acted, the order would have continued to have a negative impact upon the 
Defendants going forward. Plaintiffs failure in properly forming this case, however, did not stop 
there. 
6. THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants repeatedly requested service of process 
and of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and that no such service was ever effectuated, even 
after the expiration of the 120 days to the present. The Plaintiff simply chose to ignore the 
reasonable requests of the Defendants to properly form this case. 
7. THIS COURT FINDS that the Defendants also requested necessary information 
relating to the Preliminary Injunction, such as a list of documents and witnesses and that the Plaintiff 
failed to provide any such information to them. 
3 
8. THIS COURT FINDS that under the circumstances, the Defendants were entirely 
without ability to properly or adequately defend this matter as the case, from the beginning, has not 
been properly framed by the Plaintiff because of the Plaintiffs inability to follow basic procedure 
as set forth clearly in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9. TfflSCOURTFlNDSthatunderthec^ 
rights to attempt to defend themselves, including exercising their rights to ask the court to dismiss 
under Rule 4(bXi). As the Defendants preserved their right to object on the issue of timely service 
and lack of proper procedure, this Court would be amiss to ignore the PlaintiflTs actions and allow 
this matter to continue in such an improperly formed case. The Court finds that no prejudice will 
occur to the Plaintiff in dismissing this matter as required under Rule 4(bXi) without prejudice. The 
Court notes that the Plaintiff has already served a new suit upon the Defendants in the presence of 
this Court and that the Plaintiff has expressed the intention of filing a new action immediately 
subsequent to the hearing on this matter. The Plaintiff should have taken this action at the initial 
phases of this case after learning of its failure to properly and timely serve the Summons and 
Complaint. 
10. TfflS COURT FINDS that as the Pla^ 
this case, but persisted in advancing an improperly formed case against good reason, and as the 
Plaintiff has unnecessarily used the Court's time and caused the Defendants to defend in a void of 
pleadings and proper procedure, an award of attorney fees and costs is proper. More specifically, 
an award of those fees and costs that cannot benefit the Defendants in any future action should be 
awarded. This Court notes that a detailed billing statement has been submitted by the Defendants to 
the Court and the Court has identified those fees and costs it deems reasonably related to the 
4 
improper actions of the Plaintiff and sets forth the total amount of those fees and costs awarded 
below. 
WHEREFORE THIS COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
11. IT IS ORDERED that due to the Plaintiffs failure to abide by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including Rule 4(bXi), in forming the proper frameworic of this case by failing to ever 
serve the Summons and Complaint within 120 days, as well as failing to ever serve the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction upon the Defendants and for failing to provide necessary information to the 
Defendants for the Defendants to adequately defend this matter, that the Court dismisses the 
Plaintiff's action without prejudice. 
12. THIS COURT ORDERS that an award of reasonable attorney fees unnecessarily 
expended by the Defendants be awarded in the amount of $ and costs of suit 
unnecessarily expended by the Defendants be awarded in the amount of $ * °* ' ' The 
fees and costs shall be paid to the Defendants within thirty days of the entry of this order. 
13. IT IS ORDERED that any and all prior orders of this court, including any orders of 
injunctive relief related to this case, whether by stipulation or by direct order of this Court, are 
hereby vacated and shall have no further effect of law; and 
\\\ 
\\\ 
\\\ 
\\\ 
\\\ 
5 
14. FT IS ORDERED that all future hearing dates on the calendar for this matter are 
vacated. No trial date has been set on this matter. 
IS SO ORDERED. 
5ruary, 2007 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Submitted and prepared by: 
ROB GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES 
ADAM P. MCMUXEN, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 11063 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 301 
St George, Utah 84770 
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